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Chapter 1
Caring like a state
When I first began this project, my intention was to analyze the ways in which
militant opposition groups - usually marked as terrorist groups - position themselves as
legitimate political actors through the provision of care to those they claim to represent.
While, as I discuss below, many analysts dismissed this provision of services as coercive
strategy, when evaluated critically, this relatively recent development generates a number of
questions. Is the provision of care essentially a coercive strategy? Is this perceived coercion a
reflection of those who provide it, or the strategy itself? Could the provision of care by the
state be considered similarly coercive? I began with Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) in
the Peruvian Andes and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. Both of these
groups have received much attention, in the media and academia, for the extension of care
and services to populations under their control, as well as increasingly institutionalizing the
means to provide that care. During the height of their influence, both groups actively claimed
the right to represent and care for populations formally excluded from the national narrative
of the state in which they lived – Peruvian indigenous peasants and Sri Lankan Tamils,
respectively. Following increasing political, economic, and social marginalization throughout
the twentieth century, which was felt moreover in the lapse of government-provided services,
these opposition groups defined themselves by entering the space the government had left,
mimicking the form and function of governing structures as a form of resistance.
As I delved deeper into the complexities of these two cases, I became increasingly
interested in the problem of care itself, and how it operates as a form of governance. While
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the provision of care by oppositional groups must continually be explained and contested, the
provision of care by the state is perceived as comparatively self-explanatory; both the
provision of care and the material goods provided are deemed apolitical, and simply a matter
of functioning governance. Noticing this, I then began theorizing the provision of care, not as
a strategy of the state, but as a strategy of governing. The provision of care by opposition
groups then represented a new perspective from which to view the provision of care as a
strategy without the assumed attachment to the state. I had intended for my research question
to begin here, at the significant disjuncture between the presumed coercive nature of
provided care as a strategy of the opposition and the presumed neutrality of care provided by
states. However, in trying to analyze the provision of care by opposition groups as something
independent of the state’s provision of care, I soon ran aground. The prominence of the state
in defining the accepted form and method of care within the Peruvian and Sri Lankan
contexts continued to shape my project, and, left unaddressed, distorted my analysis of the
oppositional groups as dehistoricized and abbreviated.
Through observing what is reflected in the opposition’s provision of care, I found that
care is made an abstract principle through which a population can be aligned with its
governing body. However, in assuming that “care” could be defined and identified
independently of those who provide it, I had missed the crucial significance of oppositional
groups mimicking the care provided by the state. In using the provision of care to reach out
to a population, a relationship had been forged through a specific discourse, bound in
symbols and associations that were culturally encoded. When care is understood as a
culturally specific claim to authority, it can be understood, not only as a simple decision, but
as a practice determined by that discourse. In trying to understand the presence of the state as
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an ideological project within the discourse of care provided by other actors, I arrived at a
wholly different project. The very nature of care as a “mundane practice” of governance had
conveyed a depoliticized characterization of provided care – one that I argue is far removed
from what care as a strategy is capable of accomplishing.
As noted in the work of James Ferguson (1994) and Miriam Ticktin (2011), the
structures that provide for our preservation and care, an inherently political display of power,
are misrecognized as the impersonal or antipolitical. Rather than seating the value of
provided care in the relationship between a particular provider and recipient, I found that
further analytical work could be done in decontextualizing the provision of care as a political
strategy and then mapping that back onto the specific context of each case. In reviewing the
provision of care as a strategy throughout the twentieth century in both Peru and Sri Lanka, I
noted that care is not provided consistently or apolitically, but in extension and contraction
based on political circumstance. The very political nature of care is then demonstrated in
tracing the dynamics of provided care in relation to the relative inclusion and exclusion of
certain populations – such as in extending irrigation to certain populations, while denying
them to others, or in extending education predicated on the political alignment of recipient
populations. By working in tandem to contextualize culturally and cross-culturally, the
comparative cases that follow in subsequent chapters serve to outline the provision of care as
a political strategy, as well as demonstrate the extent to which particular state ideology
shapes the provision of that care.
As Timothy Mitchell notes, “The phenomenon we name ‘the state’ arises from
techniques that enable mundane material practices to take on the appearance of an abstract,
non-material form” (1999: 77). Mitchell continues to caution that “any attempt to distinguish
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the abstract or ideal appearance of the state from its material reality, in taking for granted this
distinction, will fail to understand it. The task of a theory of the state is not to clarify such
distinctions but to historicize them” (1999: 77). Rather than separating the material presence
of the state from its ideal appearance, the two should be seen in conjunction, as mutually
reinforcing one another – the ideal would not be conveyed without the material basis of
provided care, nor would the material be provided wholly without ideological import. To
separate the two in analysis would only create a false perception that they could be separated
in actuality. Mitchell’s subsequent conclusion – that we must historicize the relation between
the material and the ideal – provided a sounder basis for my research. To historicize in an
ethnographic register is precisely Mitchell’s intended form of analysis for the state in relation
to its material practices.
In the work that follows, I argue that the provision of care is built upon narrative and
steeped in ideology – most often in an ideology explicitly prescribing the nature of how
governance ought to work in relation to the people, which I refer to in shorthand as a “care
ideology.” Care is not only political in that it is grounded in circumstance and context, but
also in that it lies at the center of modern political life. Care acts as recognition of the
political subject, demonstrating meaningful inclusion in a community and materializing the
relationship between a provider and a recipient. Provided care therefore mediates political
relationships, both in its material and ideological dimensions. As Mitchell argues, welfare
provision cannot simply be viewed as a “two-dimensional institution,” as it is state power
that makes it appear to be a two-dimensional, direct relationship between the state apparatus
and the population (1999: 89). Welfare, and by association, care, is not a simple provision
and receipt. Instead, this work will map the provision of care onto a more fluid understanding
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of the interrelations between the state and the subject. A state “cares” as a state in order to
reproduce its own legitimacy as well as produce political subjects. This undertaking requires
that the governing body engage with a discourse already occurring among the population as
to an appropriate or acceptable form of governance. Provided care gives shape and weight to
a political association of a state and its political subjects, but, given that the discourse of
provided care exists between these two agents, care is complicated by the communication
and contestation of the care ideology in communication between the two. Ideas of who can
claim authority to rule – whether established in cultural markers, practices, or symbols – are
continually reproduced and enacted through the daily governance of the state.
In creating the structure for the project as it nowstands, and in order to articulate this
ideological communication between the provider and the recipient of care, I will use a hybrid
of Abrams’ state-system and state-idea (1988) with Althusser’s ideological and repressive
state apparatuses (1971). While Abrams uses “state apparatus” to denote the physical form of
the bureaucratic, modern state, I will refer to the same bodies in the Peruvian and Sri Lankan
cases as the “governing apparatus” to differentiate between the form of governance and the
substantive ideological project behind it. Althusser’s “ideological state,” or “state idea,”
references the means through which the state is understood conceptually as a legitimate,
functional governing agent. For the sake of this analysis, the idea of the “ideological state”
will function largely as a means for appeal to authority through the provision of care itself,
either by the formal governing structure or the population. I will use the phrase “care
ideology” to reference the constellation of ideas, symbols, and concepts that surround the
provision of care and to denote its use by both the governing structure of the state and the
population.
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By referencing care ideology as partially constitutive of the ideological state, I do not
mean to imply that the care ideology is any more closely related to the governing apparatus
than the individual that inhabits the state. The ideological basis of care instead draws upon a
set of values, beliefs, and abstractions that, although not explicitly articulated, maintain an
implicit connection in the minds of those who are socialized within that discourse or political
culture. As the case studies in the following chapters will demonstrate, the governing
apparatus may appeal to the care ideology as a means to further reproduce its authority and
claim to govern, or a certain segment of the population may choose to appeal to the same
ideology in order to assert itself in the governing apparatus. The care ideology, as with the
ideological state, can be appealed to, shaped, or interpreted by anyone sharing the same
cultural context. It is simply a discourse to be used. Ostensibly, the political experience of an
indigenous Peruvian would be different than that of a Lima urbanite, as would that of a Sri
Lankan Tamil compared to a Sri Lankan Sinhalese. It is precisely within these different
relationships to the governing state that the care ideology exists in a dynamic form –
continually reproduced through its reinterpretation and through its invocation. This
strengthens the claim that governance, as a form of authority derived from a shared culture, is
co-produced by the governing and the governed alike. As this research seeks to articulate the
ways in which authority is sought and granted, it is then necessary to consider both the
governing apparatus and its population as actors with agency in the reproduction of care
ideology. In order for either the governing apparatus or the population to relate to the other,
their claim must be legitimized through the ideology that they share; therefore, it is well
within the capacity of either the governing structures or the population to reinterpret, or claim,
the state idea in order to assert their own position in this mutually constitutive triad.
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I separate the governing state from those it governs in order to emphasize the relation
between its formal structures and the population as a site generative of the means to claim
authority; however, this is not a empirical demarcation. The relationship between the citizen
and the governing state is greatly mediated by the ideology of care and other shared cultural
conceptions of a legitimate claim to authority. It is through the provision of care that the state
idea materializes in the lives of its citizens, it is through the articulation of a care ideology
that the state idea is connected to the population that it includes in its care (and those it
excludes), and, perhaps most importantly, it is through the form of that care that the
governing apparatus is able to mold its population in reflection of the ideological state project
as a whole. As Althusser notes,
In every case, the ideology of ideology thus recognizes, despite its imaginary
distortion, that the “ideas” of the human subject exist in his actions, or ought to exist
in his actions, and if that is not the case it lends him other ideas corresponding to the
actions (however perverse) that he does perform. This ideology talks of actions: I
shall talk of actions inserted into practices. And I shall point out that these practices
are governed by the rituals in which these practices are inscribed, within the material
existence of an ideological apparatus, be it only a small part of the apparatus: a small
mass in a small church, a funeral, a minor match at a sports club, a school day, a
political party meeting, etc. (1971: 260, emphasis in original)
Althusser therefore emphasizes the everyday practices and materiality in constituting the
individual as a political subject. The provision of care then exemplifies the juncture of
everyday materiality and the transcendent ideological state. This establishes state power as a
form of “structural power,” wherein the state idea projects itself through “shap[ing] the social
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field of action so as to render some kinds of behavior possible, while making others less
possible or impossible” (Wolf 1990). Specifically, the provision of care acts as the
manifestation of the relation between the governing structures and the population. The state
idea itself provides the means to connect ideology and practice that then becomes its own
source of reproduction. The cases I will discuss here – postcolonial Peru and Sri Lanka –
demonstrate the ability of both the governing apparatus and its political subjects to appeal to
the state project. The state idea provides a narrative to inhabit as a member of that wider
community. As an ideological project, dynamic and continuously interpreted, the nature of
the state idea as comprehensive and elastic ensures its reproduction.
The capacity of the state idea to react to political circumstance and maintain
hegemony can be seen in the dominant explanations for the violence that erupted in both
Peru and Sri Lanka during the late twentieth century. The Peruvian state idea was forged in a
colonial context, and continued to be hinged on the perpetuation of a racialized hierarchy
even after independence in 1821. This hierarchy could be negotiated to a certain extent by the
conformity to valued forms of the citizen and moral subject; however, narratives of inherent
difference seated in ethnicized, if not racialized, rhetoric delimited the mobility of indigenous
citizens. The continued progress of the economic and political elite was contrasted with the
perceived stagnation of the indigenous peasantry, and further assertions of prescribed roles in
society provided the basis for conflict seated in a Marxist register. Despite evident
differences, the case of Sri Lanka can also help us think about how politics operates through
care. In the Sri Lankan case, the postcolonial state (which took power after independence
from England in 1948) is founded on a mythic national imaginary of the pre-modern
irrigation civilization under the rule of Sinhalese kings in constant struggle with their Tamil
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counterparts. The dominant academic interpretation of Sri Lanka’s recent civil war is
explained through a virulent ethnonationalism, using the origins of the nation as an arena for
contesting claims as to the rightful inheritors of the land. The exclusion of the Tamil
population by the Sinhalese state apparatus similarly relies upon this narrative in order to cast
the minority as irreconcilable with the Sri Lankan state.
In both cases, we observe that care not only mediates political relationships, but also
that these political relationships are constituted by and constitutive of relations of inclusion
and exclusion. The dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, specific to each case, then provide
an explanation for the existence of armed oppositional groups. Moreover, this politics of
exclusion is elaborated in defining who is seen as capable of integration, and who is to be
kept in continued exclusion. In the following case studies, I will demonstrate how the
provision of care is one site in which the coercive state project integrates subjects
increasingly under its aegis. For individuals capable of assuming an identity positioned in
relation to the state, traversing this imagined distance through an appeal to the state idea is a
demand of recognition in order to receive the benefits of that recognition – most notably, the
material provision of care. The provision of care, and the discourse surrounding it, therefore
becomes the terrain of a certain kind of politics of recognition that is central to postcolonial
governance.
The intention of this comparative study is not to emphasize the similarities in
postcolonial Sri Lanka and Peru. Instead, by drawing on these two cases, I seek to
demonstrate, through their distinctive contexts and histories, the relevance of the provision of
care to the nature of governance. Each case seeks to illustrate one of the more perceptible
effects of the use of provided care. While the Peruvian state functioned on the increasing
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penetration of its highland territories throughout the twentieth century, the Sri Lankan state
operated primarily through the reproduction of symbols that ground the actions of the state
historically. In focusing on the twentieth century for both postcolonial states, I will analyze
state formation in reference to the use of care as a point of access to the population in the
expansion of the capacity of the governing structures and in the weight of the state idea.
This movement through the recent past, in conjunction with a theoretical framework,
is meant to provide a means to view the state as a project in and of itself – continual, dynamic,
and prone to moments of rupture (such as the appearance of armed opposition groups). The
further expression and accumulation of ideas surrounding the state moves towards, not only
the realization of the imagined social body in a unitary, homogeneous population, but also in
the further articulation of the legitimate means by which to govern that body. In Peru, the
twentieth century was characterized by a progression of different forms of advocacy for the
peasantry. The case study in this research traces the progression from the advocacy of
indigenous citizens in intellectual circles, to the articulation of indigenous or peasant identity
in relation to the moral ideals of the Peruvian state, and ultimately, to the formation of
peasant federations in the demand for the political recognition from the indigenous
highlanders. The Sri Lankan case draws upon a shorter time period, spanning 1948 to
roughly the 1980s, as the Sinhalese governing apparatus affected a significant amount of
state building in a few short decades. The case study follows the articulation and elaboration
of the ideal Sri Lankan citizen in relation to religion, occupation, caste, and ultimately
ethnicity.
Returning to the quote by Mitchell at the beginning of this chapter, the state project
can be viewed more comprehensively through tracing the provision of care and historicizing
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care within its own cultural context. These cases, with all their accompanying differences, do
not speak past each other, but rather give a more comprehensive articulation of the use of the
provision of care, demonstrating in their own way the manner in which the operation of the
state is rendered neutral while in a trenchantly political terrain. Moving through these cases
will then better articulate questions that arise following the assertion of care as a new strategy
of governance. What exactly is this relationship between the provision of care and the
reproduction of the state? What aspect of the state does it serve to maintain and how is its
maintenance space for the further interaction of the formal apparatus and the population?
In the remainder of this chapter I provide an overview of the key theoretical terms
and concepts that I will use in my analysis. I then turn to an extended discussion of the two
cases, beginning first with an account of roads and education in highland Peru (Chapter 2)
and then an account of national development initiatives and the extension of irrigation
projects in Sri Lanka (Chapter 3). In both cases I use seemingly banal examples of civil
infrastructure in order to demonstrate how the provision of care is framed as an act of
inclusion and how these forms of care become central to the state project overall. Using care
as a point of entry in discussing the state project, I argue that there are clear connections
between the material experience of daily life, how that experience is then framed in discourse,
and how that discourse works to reproduce the state idea. Specifically, in both Sri Lanka and
Peru, there is an identifiable ideology of care that is articulated in the discourse surrounding
welfare provision, a construction of the ideal citizen that is fostered through that welfare
provision, and the consequent engineering of a population that is molded to match the state as
an ideological project. A comparison of both cases will follow along with overall conclusions.
***
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In focusing upon a set of practices and ideas as diffuse as the provision of care, it is
important to articulate exactly what about these practices presents itself as an object of study.
How are the ideological dimension and material effects of care related? How does the
provision of care itself affect the alignment to certain political subjectivities? Why is care the
most relevant strategy to observe in the formation of political subjects in these two cases? As
noted by Clifford Geertz, the state has succeeded in a substantial project when the interests
and actions of the state are reflected in its population: “For a state to do more than administer
privilege and defend itself against its own population, its acts must seem continuous with the
selves of those whose state it pretends it is, its citizens – to be, in some stepped-up, amplified
sense, their acts” (1973: 317, emphasis in original). The provision of care, I argue, extends
the state into the lives of its subjects in both an ideological and material capacity. The state is
established first as the source of material wellbeing, facilitating dependency. The ideological
dimension of care then provides meaningful inclusion for that subject within the state,
encouraging a further relationship. It is then the form of that care, exactly what is provided
by the state, that directs the life of the citizen, shaping the subject and positioning him or her
in relation to the state project.
The theoretical framework of this project centers upon the state, not as a singular
entity, but an amalgam of interrelated processes, projects, and systems working cooperatively
to reproduce the state as the means to orient political subjects in relation to these processes.
These processes, projects, and systems, in conjunction, then produce the image of a singular
state as well as identifiable effects of the functioning of that entity. My own account of the
state and governance is based in the work of Michel Foucault (e.g. 1980, 2007) and Antonio
Gramsci (1992), particularly in light of the nature of state power that facilitates the
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reproduction of the state through the population. While Foucault articulates a state power that
works through the individual in order to manifest its power, Gramsci articulates an
ideological power that works to replicate itself through the individual’s alignment and
consensus in civil society. In conjunction, the two mirror the material and ideological aspects
of the provision of care. Through comparing the work of Foucault and Gramsci, the study of
state power can be read as a gloss by which to refer to the many ways in which the state
project is affected in order to reproduce itself.
This analysis of the state is reinforced by the work of Michel Rolph Trouillot (2003)
and James Scott (1998) through the articulation of the methods and means of the formal state
apparatus via state effects. Both theorists provide a theory of the state seated in the strategies
and logic of the state rather than its form. Building on their insights, I suggest we think of
care as a key strategy and effect of governance. Finally, I will conclude by drawing on
anthropological work on citizenship in order to articulate an account of political subjectivity
and the state project. This discussion will focus primarily on the dialectical relation between
inclusion and exclusion that is reproduced by the selective provision of care. Elaborated
particularly in reference to the postcolony, I will cite the work of James Holston (2008),
Mahmood Mamdani (1996), and Deborah Poole (2004) in order to articulate the nature of
meaningful inclusion in the post-colony and its relation to formal, juridical forms. In the
remainder of this chapter I sketch out these three domains in more detail.

Consenting to be governed
As articulated by Michel Foucault, the modern state no longer only seeks control
through the maintenance of territorial borders, but, more significantly, through the control of
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its population. Moreover, sovereign power has been redirected from the explicit control over
life and death to the ability to “foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault 1984:
261). This method of politics, or “biopolitics,” uses the physiological needs of the body
(sexual, nutritional, or otherwise) as a means by which to control and shape the body, and
metonymically, the entire population. The institutions that Foucault analyzes – penal
institutions, hospitals, asylums – can be considered as disciplinary applications of force by
the government, actively shaping political subjects. The provision of care can be comparably
viewed as a gentler, but no less effective, means of shaping political subjects in relation to
the state.
What is done materially through biopolitics is reflected in the capacity of the state
idea to then engineer consent. Because sovereignty is not simply a claim made solely by
merit of control of land or the use of force, the reproduction of the claim to authority must be
analyzed not as a declarative norm, but as a constant reassertion, demanding recognition and
acceptance. Read as a form of Gramscian hegemony, sovereignty functions through consent
as well as coercion. It is not by the fact of sovereignty that the state governs, but through
daily governing that the state produces sovereignty. According to Foucault (and in the
European context), this reorientation of the state signaled the moment at which the individual
life became the point of intervention for the state. Therefore, at the crux of such biopolitical
regimes is the facilitation of a biological life for a particular population, especially as the
need for assistance in sustaining that life becomes an entry point for the state apparatus in
personal life. The extension of irrigation in Sri Lanka works to facilitate subsistence farming
that also ensures that the population benefiting from that irrigation will be tied to the land
through subsistence farming. The construction of roads in Peru establishes the routes
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available to indigenous highlanders, and therefore determines the mobility of that population.
The material dimension of provided care determines the shaping and positioning of a subject
in relation to the state. When combined with the ideological weight of the state idea, the two
strategies of governing authority work in conjunction to create a political subjectivity tailored
to that state idea. I argue that it is specifically through the provision of care that these twin
strategies work in conjunction most explicitly.
The provision of care, used loosely to refer to the provision of material benefits and
services to a certain population, can therefore be used as a gloss to refer to the programs of
assistance that the state uses to directly facilitate the life of its population, or in absence of
the state, “expose” it (Foucault 1984: 258). Provided care is simultaneously a discourse and a
practice – facilitating the continued wellbeing of a certain demarcated population as well as
shaping the ways in which that form of life is articulated. In addition to the material
implications of whether lives will be sustained in the relation to the state, a more
comprehensive project is advanced by the state idea to arrive at a form of life commensurable
with its own reproduction. The state therefore works to reproduce itself in establishing
congruency in both the life lived within the state and the means by which that life is
controlled as subject to the state. Therefore, it is the day-to-day monitoring and management
of the population that becomes the new locus of sovereignty and the establishment of the
claim or authority to govern. For the sake of this research, I will focus on the particular form
of state power that materializes in its provision of care, and in doing so, is able to establish
the state as the center and the source of life itself for its population.
The provision of care as a continuous process must then be recognized as a political
strategy of the state, not as the antipolitical function of governance. From a theoretical
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standpoint, a comprehensive understanding of the state must include the provision of care as
fundamental to the political terrain of the modern state – all aspects of state activity must be
considered in light of the need to reproduce legitimacy, not merely attain it. The provision of
care, the literal opposite of the use of force, pushes the understanding of political strategy
further to necessitate a reappraisal of the means available to legitimate governance. In
disassociating provided care from its assumed role as the apolitical provision of neutral
goods, and instead throwing it into the arena with other forms of political strategy, we can
broaden our understanding of the state and governance.
The provision of care can then be considered a model of the “interventions and
regulatory controls” that characterize biopolitics as a method of the state (Foucault 1984:
262). As a reinforcing and mutually constitutive pattern of relation, care constitutes an
avenue by which the state affects its citizenry, and, as a result of this established relationship,
the citizenry, in turn, can affect the state. The legitimacy produced by providing welfare to a
certain, demarcated population remains dependent on the state’s continued, stable
relationship with that population to the extent that the needs of the citizens and the ability of
the state would progressively become coterminous. Building upon a Gramscian conception of
civil society (1992) wherein the state’s ability to effect collective consensus is fundamental
to its reproduction, Louis Althusser’s work helps develop an expanded account of politics
that includes consent and coercion, or what he calls ideology and repression. Althusser’s
(1971) disambiguation of ideological state apparatus and the repressive state apparatus
reveals significant space to see the effect of the citizenry in appealing to the state idea in
comparison to the effect of the formal governing apparatus appealing to the state idea.
Drawing the issue of continuous reproduction from Althusser’s same essay, Ideology and
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Ideological State Apparatuses, the ideological state should be seen as “not only what is at
stake, but the site of struggle” itself (1971: 245). The production and the reproduction of the
ideological state is then at the hands of both the state apparatus and its population, and the
state idea is reproduced specifically during these exchanges of these two bodies, making
welfare a particularly generative terrain for the articulation of the state as a dynamic and
interpretive “third order object” (Abrams 1988: 76).

Reproducing consensus, reproducing the state
The ability of the state to derive legitimacy from its provision of care is contingent
upon first, the demarcation of the specific population that is to be cared for, and second, the
demonstration that the provided means of care is tailored to benefit that population uniquely.
Often, then, it seems like the care provided is in response to the interests and needs of the
population; however, it is through this assumed origin that legitimacy is established and
reproduced. As noted by Geertz in the passage above, this is the result of subjects
internalizing the state project as constitutive of their own identities. The nature of the
provision of care uniquely enables the governing apparatus to construct a form or set
standard of life for its citizens, and, in establishing that form as the valued or idealized object,
draws its population into alignment. As will be argued in each case study, it is the form of
provided care that advances the formation of certain subjects as a result of that care. For
example, in Sri Lanka, the provision of water via irrigation systems enables a population that
is both settled and settled within communal villages that seek support only from a centralized
state apparatus. In Peru, where governance is predicated on the provision of education, the
state is able to control government-funded schools as “citizenship factories,” therefore
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actively constructing the form of citizenry for the indigenous population (García 2005: 12).
The Peruvian state is therefore able to actively shape its citizens in reflection of the form of
participation it wishes to include under its aegis. The care provided by the state therefore
pulls the subject into a dependent relationship with the governing apparatus, establishing the
state as the source of wellbeing.
This form of political subject projected by the state is comprehensive – if accepted, it
dictates not only performed aspects of identity, but also personal valuations of the self. The
ideal form is then presented in order to be internalized, routinized, and reproduced in every
action of the individual in a substantial display of the state’s capillary power, effecting
change not through the formal channels, but through the body of citizenry itself (Foucault
1980: 96). Although the individual is not determined by the overarching state idea alone,
seeing the formation of subjectivity as a result of the state does serve to outline the way in
which the ideological power of the state can be accessed by the governing apparatus and the
individual alike. Like Wolf’s structural power, the discourses surrounding a deserving
population and a legitimate government are delimited according to these terms. According to
Althusser, it is the ideology of the state itself that “hails or interpellates individuals as
subjects” (1971: 265). The state idea, when articulated as a project to associate with, calls
subjects either to participate, or to be marked by their refusal. Therefore, the state idea is a
form of interpellation, to which the subject must either comply or deny. As Corrigan and
Sayer similarly articulate in the parallels they draw between the consolidation of state power
and the establishment of a unified culture, it is through the establishment of a valued form,
and the limitations on other forms, that the governing apparatus can engineer its desired
population. As they note,
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Out of a vast range of human social capabilities – possible ways in which social life
could be lived – state activities more or less forcibly “encourage” some whilst
suppressing, marginalizing, eroding, undermining others […] Certain forms of
activity are given the official seal of approval, others are situated beyond the pale.
This has cumulative, and enormous, cultural consequences; consequences for how
people identify (in many cases, have to identify) themselves and their “place” in the
world. (1985: 4, emphasis in original)
These states then utilize the hegemonic power of the state idea to establish a consensus
before a consensus is realized among the population itself. The cultural field of meaning that
gives weight to authority and legitimacy is also a structural field that acts to define the
boundaries of the same discourse, in many ways determining what is voiced by the
population. It is not the collective interest of a population that appeals to the state for a
certain means by which to be cared for, but it is the state that engineers both the form of care
and subsequently the population itself.
Assuming the provision of care to be a benign function of governance is, in effect, a
result of this. The consensus generated in aligning the needs of the subjects with those of the
state obfuscates the process that first created that consensus. Instead of the state hailing its
subjects, it appears that the subjects are hailing the state of their own volition. As Philip
Abrams argues (1988), the state is a particular form of power that mystifies the form and
function of its “real relations” by masking the operative connections between its ideological
and material projects. Through this research I seek to demonstrate the unique form of state
power that is able to obfuscate the functionality of the provision of care, and in doing so,
protect it as a source of reproducing legitimacy. While, for instance, the provision of a stable
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water supply throughout the dry season, or the guarantee of a primary education, may seem
to fall short of the ideological significance necessary to reproduce the state, the manner in
which welfare is used as a function of biopolitics demonstrates the significance of the
everyday in relation to stability of the transcendent state idea.
The use of care as a strategy can then be seen to operate on two planes: that which is
identifiable to the public, and that which is hidden by the nature of state power. The aim of
this research is to interrogate the ways in which the provision of care has been used and to
demonstrate the relation between the consolidation of state power and the reproduction of the
state idea. In the following case studies, I will show that there are two ways in which care
operates as a form of state power and governance. First, care reproduces symbolic legitimacy
as an available method to reproduce governing legitimacy. The reproduction of symbolic
legitimacy works through an increasingly established network of symbols and forms that,
through relational meanings, form a foundation from which the state, as an ideological
project, is built. By further intertwining culturally recognized symbols in its functioning, the
state is able to further project itself as a locus of authority unique to its population. Regimes
and leaders are therefore able to draw upon these various symbols in order to reproduce
symbolically the legitimacy of the state in form and function readily identifiable by most
citizens. Second, by providing or not providing care, the state can extend itself into territories
and populations, or abandon those areas and people to the margins. This extension of the
state then serves to expand “state effects,” as articulated by theorists such as Scott (1998) and
Trouillot (2003), facilitating the increasing organization and homogenization of bodies to
mimic a singular, collective body as idealized by the concept of a nation. State effects
demonstrate the ability of states to shape reality in reflection of state structures. Through

20

making populations legible, discrete, and increasingly homogenized, the state project
becomes easier to effect. The state’s needs are then reflected in the spatial organization of
populations, their assumed identities, and the manner in which they interact with the state.
In establishing a narrative of responsibility, the state seeks to link the population to
the governing apparatus through an increasingly abstract relationship. By gradually
deemphasizing the material, or real, dimension of care and relying upon the abstract and
ideological, the state is able to solidify an affective relationship between its subjects and
governing apparatus. Care for the included population is no longer a matter of material
provision, but felt as a meaningful inclusion in the state as a result of having assumed the
correct identity in relation to the state. Provided care is therefore an entry for the state to exist
in its subjects’ minds as an ideological real. Through distorting the relation between the
state’s function and its form, this strategy works “to elicit support for, or tolerance of, the
insupportable and intolerable by presenting them as something other than themselves, namely,
legitimate, disinterested domination” (Abrams 1988: 76). These intended aims of the use of
care – the reproduction of authority and mechanisms of control – encourage the increasing
interrelation of terms both in articulating legitimacy and identity. As a dimension of the
hegemonic control of the state, forms of identity and legitimacy are increasingly articulated
in relation to the state idea. This hegemony is manifest through the individual as there is
benefit for individuals to position themselves in relation to the state both for meaningful
inclusion and access to material benefits as provided by systems of care. These positional
identities then become entrenched in both the symbolic and penetrative projects of the state,
and ultimately internalized and reproduced by the population itself. The state then becomes a
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locus of authoritative power exerting a coercive force much like gravitation that draws
increasingly more forms of identity and legitimacy into its orbit.

Inclusion, exclusion, and the in between
A state’s population – increasingly defined as a unitary, cohesive whole – cannot be
defined by inclusion alone. In every act of inclusion, there is also an act of exclusion.
Inclusion is made meaningful either through the use of culturally relevant systems of
meaning, or as a structural relation that hails certain groups. In the latter, certain identity
effects are created in order to turn performance of an identity into a meaningful inclusion.
Inclusion will then derive additional meaning through its negation.
This presents a significant contradiction with Western norms of egalitarian citizenship.
In what Foucault would refer to as “pastoral governance,” where the equality of each
individual is reflected in his or her receipt of equal political and civil rights, the Western
construct of citizenship is founded on indiscriminate inclusion of all within its borders
(Foucault 2007: 125). However, this definition of citizenship is only superficial – all political
inclusion is inherently hierarchical. While the status of citizenship is granted freely in
reflection of recognized equality, the rights and privileges that attend it can be withheld. This
gap in provision of rights has been referred to as the increasing separation between “formal
citizenship” and “substantive citizenship” (Holston 2008). Political systems, notably
postcolonial states, that previously functioned on networks of power and granting privileges
and status according to those networks must then be reconciled with the norm of inclusive
citizenship. As articulated by Mahmood Mamdani (1996), this pattern, particularly in the
African postcolonial context, led to the bifurcation of the state and the distinction between
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citizen and subject. Mamdani’s account of postcolonial African states reflects my point that,
in reconciling inclusive citizenship with a hierarchical politics, a new hierarchy must be
established within citizen that still allows the state to position its subjects in relation to the
governing apparatus. This positioning allows the state to maintain itself as the benefactor of
all its subjects, and therefore the source of all rights and benefits that would be tied to
citizenship. In separating the presumed rights of citizenship with the substantive protection
that it connotes, the postcolonial state is able to maintain legitimacy from governing a
specified, unitary population while superficially including all within its recognized territory.
This separation between assigned status and substantial benefit highlights a
significant contradiction in the functioning of the state as an apparatus and the state as an
ideological project: as the governing apparatus seeks control through homogenization, the
state as an ideological project seeks instead to impose hierarchy that encourages the
positioning of the individual in relation to the state. While the first prioritizes the legibility
and uniformity of all citizens, the second hinges upon difference to demarcate its boundaries
based on the performance of a certain identity and relation to the state itself. The ideological
state seeks a negative image from which to articulate its present and future self. Most
importantly, this functions as an internal demarcation, defining who is included and excluded
within the territorial borders of the state, as well as a space of marginality – offering the
potential of future inclusion. Giorgio Agamben (2005) has argued that the state is never truly
absent; rather, when it seems to be, the state has exercised its prerogative to be absent and,
therefore, demonstrates an even greater form of power. The margins are then to be
recognized as where the state project is most coercive – where alignment to the state project
is required in order to be included, but those who are excluded still necessarily remain in
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relation to the state, maintaining the hegemonic nature of the state project by merit of their
own distinction. This contradiction is uniquely productive in that it allows the state to operate
in the continual arrangement and repositioning of its citizens in relation to the abstract and
idealized state, sustaining substantial coercive force until the individual aligns to the state
project.
As I will show in detail in the following chapters, the demarcation of a population
according to the inclusion, and subsequent exclusion, of certain groups is explicit in both
Peru and Sri Lanka, and the manner in which that differentiation serves to further the state
project is deeply imbricated in the nature of each as separate ideological projects. Provided
care can then be analyzed across this divide, between those who are cared for and those who
are not, and the divide itself, the margins, where the inclusive and exclusive strategies of the
state overlap. As the two cases show, these margins can be geographic or spatial realities, but
it is the culturally determined division of ethnicized or racilized identities that constitutes the
margins as a political strategy. In Sri Lanka, the state idea, and its accompanying symbolic
import, was harnessed by the state apparatus in order to legitimize ordering the state in
reflection of its Sinhalese majority. In Peru, the state idea was used as the basis of appeal by
indigenous citizens in order to receive the benefits of the state apparatus and integrate
themselves into the state as a whole. However, both the state apparatus in Sri Lanka and the
indigenous movements of the Peruvian highlands used the provision of care as a basis from
which to articulate the state’s relation to the population. By comparing these cases we will
see, whether state power is used on behalf of the formal governing structure or the population,
it will serve to augment the state as an ideological project, which transcends both the function
and the form of the state itself.
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Chapter 2
Peru, the penetrative state
In The Art of Not Being Governed, James Scott ponders the efficacy of mapping the
extent of social and economic exchange on a topographical map using what Scott refers to as
the “friction of terrain” to determine a more accurate distance between points of interest
(2009: 47). In a map in which “the unit of measurement is not distance, but the time of travel,”
Scott reasserts the reality of the state over its imagined whole to properly address the evident
difference between state boundaries and the actual reach of the state. Governance in Peru
functions in largely the same capacity. While state boundaries encompass territory, in
actuality, the land under state control is constrained by accessibility. The Peruvian state has
therefore extended or receded its civil infrastructure, such as roads, as necessity (economic or
otherwise) dictates. The means to access the state in other ways, such as an education, are
similarly delimited according to these exigencies. The Peruvian state is, in short, a
penetrative state, built upon the expansion and consolidation of civil infrastructure that
conveys state power throughout its territory. The Peruvian Andes in particular, and the extent
to which the state has chosen to be present there, is indicative of the state project overall.

Establishing the margins through the Peruvian state
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, manyPeruvian intellectuals have
emphasized the difference between the “legal Peru” and the “real Peru” (Poole 1997: 155).
Originally a distinction between the state and civil society, this binary was later ethnicized to
emphasize the difference between the modern state and the Andean peasantry. The Andes
itself was shorthand to denote the margins of the Peruvian state, particularly the southern
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region, which some pejoratively call “the Indian stain” (mancha india). While the Andes, as
a cultural and social region, extends beyond national borders, the departments of Cuzco,
Apurimac, Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Puno comprise the Peruvian region (Handelman
1975: 21). When political territorial borders are congruous with large geographic features,
like a large mountain range, it is perhaps easier to imagine the nation as a unitary entity,
despite the lack of substantive integration at its borders. However, it is a state that is defined
by territorial borders, but a nation that defines itself by its population. To strengthen its claim
to govern, the Peruvian governing apparatus united the governing claim of the state with the
legitimacy of leading a nation. The Peruvian state is imagined and narrated as a nation of a
certain people, commensurate with the ideological Peru – an urbanized, educated population
in a rapidly industrializing state. Following independence in 1821, the Peruvian nation
deliberately set itself on the path of modernization in order to revive its economy, leaving the
heritage of the nation, and its indigenous population, behind (Klarén 2000: 139-140).
Although the indigenous population of Peru is hardly dismissible,1 this narrative has become
crucial to the Peru national narrative.
This then led to the further disassociation of the indigenous from the Peruvian nation
as the indigenous were considered irreconcilable with the imagined Peru. Political elites
“produced a picture of Peru in which Indians were anchored to the Andes (the sierra) but
were rhetorically absent from the coast, purportedly populated by mestizos and whites” (de la
Cadena 2000: 45). As indicated by de la Cadena, identity in Peru is recognized first and
foremost in relation to ethnicity, which has become increasingly racialized over the years.

1

Estimates for the relevant time frame, roughly the first few decades of the twentieth century, vary between
60% (government census) and 80% (Mariategui’s famous assertion) (Coronado 2009: 10). However, since the
indigenous populations are regionally concentrated, it is important to note that in the mancha india, the
peasantry make up over 80% of the population (Handelman 1975: 40).
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Identity is then determined by aligning to one of the primary identities – white or indigenous
– or some combination of the two – such as mestizo – that indicates mixed lineage. The
imagined difference of the two populations was then mapped back onto the geographic
realities of the Peruvian state. As Mary Weismantel notes, the highland indigenous, or
serranos, were considered to be “isolated autochthons rooted in their own communities”
while the limeños were urban Peruvians, distinguished by the relationship to the capital,
Lima (2001: xxii). This spatial separation was then read as a social and political distance
between the highlands and the lowlands; shorthand by which “people were ranked according
to their surroundings: the higher the geographical elevation, the lower the social status of its
inhabitants” (de la Cadena 2000: 21). As the dominant narrative of indigeneity was similarly
tied to conceptions of backwardness and reluctance to modernize, the Andean highlands were
increasingly treated by political elites as the hinterlands, beyond the reach of state. This
impression was then compounded by what Weismantel refers to as “the political geography
of race” (Weismantel 2001: 5). The racilaized difference between the two populations and
their spatial separation then worked in tandem to conclusively separate the “legal” state from
the “real” margins. The margins of Peru were then an internal exclusion, shaping the nation
ideologically as well as geographically. Therefore, distance from the governing apparatus
was not only felt as a spatial separation, but also in a lack meaningful inclusion in the nation,
particularly the lack of provided care.
Framing the margins as a space apart from the state reinforces the coercive dimension
of the construction of the margins. As the state chooses where to be absent, it simultaneously
exerts pressure on the citizen to enter into a reciprocal relationship in order to attain
meaningful inclusion. Therefore it is not the state that extends itself to the citizenry, but the
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citizenry that must appeal to the state for their inclusion – often through offering their
participation or other form of contribution; “the ‘periphery’ may reach toward the center to
embrace the nation” (Nugent 1997: 322). This voluntary association demonstrates that where
the state is absent, the state is able to exert its coercive force most directly. However, as
David Nugent cautions, “to conceive of the nation-state as only coercive – to view its
relations with society as strictly oppositional – is to privilege above all else one limited and
contingent dimension of a relationship that is in reality much more dense and complex”
(1997: 323, emphasis in original). The Peruvian state worked both in opposition and in
conjunction with its citizens – particularly throughout the twentieth century – to define itself
as a nation-state. The relationship between the Peruvian state and the highlanders is therefore
dynamic, and the relative association of the highlanders with the state can then be read to
reveal the efficacy of the Peruvian state project.
It is precisely this imagined distance between the highland Indian and the urban
citizen that constituted the form of Peruvian governance in the twentieth century; “the
dialectic relationship between indigenous peoples and national society, has (re)emerged in
Peru as the basis for renegotiating identity politics and citizenship in the country” (García
2005: 158-159: Ramos 1998). José Carlos Mariátegui, a Peruvian intellectual of the early
twentieth century, echoed this in his own theories of indigenous revolution in the Andes
(1971). From Mariátegui’s communist perspective, the resulting synthesis of this dialectic
would bring communism to the urban areas and modernization to the highlands. Without this
synthesis, the confrontation of these mutually distinct entities would continue. However, it is
this imagined dialectic that has further entrenched perceptions of the indigenous and the state
as inherently contentious and unable to be reconciled. To characterize indigenous advocacy
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as seeking only to contest the state is to misrecognize the significance of citizens appealing to
the state in order to seek care through the provision of the governing apparatus. In identifying
the ways in which this imagined divide could be crossed, new forms of indigenous advocacy
and demands for inclusion are made apparent. This is anecdotally illustrated by the fact that,
during many land seizures in the southern Andes in the 1960s, indigenous peasant federations
would claim land by planting the Peruvian flag, “indicating that these seizures were merely
securing their rights as Peruvian citizens” (Handelman 1975: 111). This claim demonstrates
that the formal state was not wholly severed from the indigenous population. Instead, the
Peruvian state was a national identity to be claimed by her people. While not seeking
homogenization, indigenous communities have, to a significant extent, consistently sought
inclusion in the Peruvian state.
The demand to be protected by the state was articulated primarily in the experience of
what happened in the state’s absence. Following Peruvian independence in 1821, and
continuing until the turn of the century, the highlands were ruled by the landed aristocracy –
castas.2 As de la Cadena notes, the highlands were “virtually a frontier zone […] Land titles
were scarce, even nonexistent; ‘justice’ and ‘law’ were euphemistic terms, and power
depended on private armed forces” (2000: 97-98). The ruling aristocracy were considered to
be “wholly distinct’” from the Andean population, which served to further exploitation and
abuse at the hands of the largely invulnerable gamonales3 (Nugent 1997: 30). Here,
difference, particularly racial difference, conferred legitimacy to govern. Race was used as a

2

The casta española were the elite families that, by merit of their claimed relation to colonial aristocracy,
“controlled virtually all positions of public prominence – political, economic, religious, military, social, and
educational” (Nugent 1997: 35).
3
While hacendados and gamonales are both terms that refer to landowning elites, hacendados were considered
to be legitimately established through ancestral property ownership, while gamonales referred to those who had
not only illegitimately obtained their property, but also exploited their workers (de la Cadena 2000: 82-83).
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“weapon of the aristocracy” to legitimize rule (Stepputat 2005: 80). The Peruvian state
largely considered casta rule as an intermediary rule that allowed the state access to the
resources of the Andes without requiring the dedication of a large administrative apparatus.
Beyond ensuring the supply of agricultural goods to urban centers, the state had little interest
in extending itself into the highlands. The castas therefore “gained control over the local
machinery of the state” in order to aggregate authority and perpetuate their autocratic and
arbitrary rule (Nugent 1997: 39).
However, the ruling casta still had to maintain a façade by which its actions could be
seen in comparison to egalitarian ideals of the newly independent republic. Therefore, “the
ruling casta was forced to adopt the central state’s standards of representation in certain
specific and limited domains” (Nugent 1997: 155). By enacting a discourse of egalitarian
ideals to establish their own authority, the castas also opened the juridico-legal door for
Andean citizens to make demands on their state as based in their rights as citizens, primarily
through demanding access to the civil infrastructure of the state. Serranos sought recognition
first and foremost by the governing apparatus, and the stability and predictability of the
Peruvian legal system that accompanied that recognition. Economic exigency similarly
provided motivation for the Andean citizen to gain recognition, since the average serrano
was so disconnected from the national market that even the economic bonanza that swept
Peru in the first decade of the twentieth century did not reach them. The highlanders
therefore also sought access to the governing apparatus in material terms, through the
provision of civil infrastructure. Through roads and education, the indigenous citizen
attempted to negotiate integration into the Peruvian state without submitting to the
homogenizing state project. Provision, or access to provided care, became key to determining
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meaningful inclusion in the Peruvian state. A claim to citizenship was equivalent to a claim
to access.
During the same period in the early twentieth century, the political elites of Peru
looked to its indigenous inhabitants to construct a symbolic locus of authority. It was during
the “rediscovery of the Indians” in the later nineteenth century that indigenous citizens
became alternately sources for authentic tradition and objects for modernization for the
industrializing Peruvian state (Klarén 2000: 245-247). The indigenismo movement of the
1920s then further developed this idea, at least symbolically equating the invocation of
indigenous roots with a legitimate claim to political authority.4 The indigenismo movement
was propelled by intellectuals and politicians alike, who saw political utility in the provision
for, and limited inclusion of, the indigenous population. However, without allowing space for
self-representation, these policies foreshadowed the paternalism that would later become
characteristic of welfare policies in the Andes. The movement did not seek to empower the
indigenous population, but instead used a caricature of the indigenous subject to further the
agenda of political elites: “As they [Peruvian political elites and intellectuals] mounted their
titular defense of the indios, they also created an image or figure that could represent, and do
so amply” (Coronado 2009: 14). In representing indigenous communities as static and
historicized relics of Peruvian culture, the movement perpetuated the idea of that the
Peruvian indigenous population was incapable of being entrusted as true citizens of the
republic. As Thurner notes, “Creole liberals would continue to blame the Spanish for having

4

Notable intellectuals and works of the indigenista school of the early twentieth century included novels such as
Clorinda Matto de Turner’s Aves sin nido (1889) and Enrique López Albújar’s Cuentos Andinos (1920) and
Matalache (1928) as well as political works such as José Uriel García’s El nuevo Indio (1930) and Luis
Eduardo Vacárcel’s Tempestad en los Andes (1927). Political journals were also relevant, such as Amauta
(1926-1930) published by José Carlos Mariátegui and Haya de la Torre, and La Sierra, (1927-1930) published
by Valcárcel, José Uriel García, and others (Klarén 2000:245-7).
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‘frozen’ the Indians in a kind of primordial stupor which, they now rationalized, in effect
rendered them incapable of assuming the responsibilities and privileges of full citizenship in
the Peruvian republic” (1997: 11). This reconciles the apparent contradiction in reverence for
the Incan civilization and the lack of established trust in its descendants. As Mariátegui notes,
there was a stark distinction between seeking the economic emancipation of the indigenes
and providing for their wellbeing as framed by a “liberal, humanitarian, enlightened
nineteenth century attitude” (1971: 25). In casting the indigenous as recipients of care instead
of citizens with a right to that care, the Peruvian state found a new reconciliation of the two
Peruvian identities through governance in a paternalist register.
The reforms made by Augusto B. Leguía’s government in the 1920s recognized the
political significance of the growing indigenista movement, yet did little to alter the division
between the indigenous and the true Peruvian citizenry. Leguía referred to his second term
(1919-1930) as “La Patria Nueva” in recognition of his openly pro-indigenista, and
inherently paternalistic, policies. Also referred to as the Oncenio, the eleven-year period of
Leguía’s second term was characterized by increased foreign investment and massive
migration from the highlands to urban centers (Coronado 2009: 9). Lima itself doubled from
200,000 in 1919 to 375,000 by the late 1920s as Andean highlanders moved to urban areas in
hopes of becoming integrated in the new economy, and from 1920 to 1921, the number of
roads in Peru nearly doubled through a conscripted work law. (Coronado 2009: 29). Official,
legal recognition of Indian communities was subsequently granted under Leguía in the 1920
constitution. While both these efforts sought to grant indigenous citizens nominal access to
the state, they did little in actuality to aid in the substantive integration of serranos. Through
the implementation of these reforms, the status of the indigenous as a secondary, or marked,
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citizen was only further emphasized. The Ley de Conscripción Vial, the corvée labor act,
intended to expand the reach of the state through road systems, utilized the same groups that
had always been exploited for manual labor across Peru, the poor and the indigenous,
through forced and unpaid labor. As Coronado notes, “Perverted from the ideals of a
liberatory indigenismo, this law meant to free up indigenous labor by removing it from the
land and channeling it toward modernizing projects” (2009: 9). Through conscripted labor
and official recognition as a marked citizen, the Leguían reforms sent a clear message to the
indigenous highlanders. As expressed by García, “the state has given you these programs;
participate or lose access to these resources that have been generously offered to your people”
(2005: 10). Access therefore came at the cost of aligning indigenous identity to a form of
service to the state. The “good republicano” was an identity offered and articulated through
these reforms in which “contribución” to the state, through both labor and tax, was the
performance of a positional identity that would convey a limited form of inclusion (Thurner
1997: 34).

Crafting the ideal citizen and el pueblo
The liberal state project would not itself be complete until the indigenous would
identify first and foremost as Peruvian citizens. Notably, there was a significant disjuncture
between the acceptance of the serranos as contributing members of the Peruvian state, and
the inclusion of serranos as equal members of Peruvian society. While the governing
apparatus sought the further homogenization of its population through its own control and
access to the Andes, Peruvian society itself was still very much dependent upon a racial
hierarchy present since its Spanish conquest. Regardless of the contradictory forms of
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inclusion that were provided to the serranos through policy reform, meaningful inclusion in
Peruvian society was still delimited by race. However, as García notes, “When racial
oppression has threatened citizenship, the liberal response has been to attempt to eliminate
the legal structures that enforce that oppression so that race can again be taken out of the mix
of politics; citizenship once again becomes color-blind” (2005: 165). The interests of the
governing elite, and moreover the ability of the governing apparatus to access the highlanders,
superseded the interests of the Peruvian national narrative. Instead, the state remained
focused on the integration of the indigenous population through gradual assimilation (García
2005: 67). Here, it is clear that the perceived solution for the so-called indigenous problem
was the racial assimilation of the highlanders in the long term, and their education in the
short-term. While race was the essentialized locus of difference, only mutable through
“eugenic schemes” or miscegenation, education was seen as a form of moral improvement
that could be performed by the individual (de la Cadena 2000: 17). The concept of “Peruvian
decency” was constructed through Peruvian society as a moral regulation of the individual,
providing inclusion through behavioral alignment to what was considered to be the social
norms of the urban elite. It was therefore the molding of indigenous identity, both through
race and the performance of race, that would provide the idealized unitary Peruvian identity.
The governing apparatus therefore predicated inclusion in the erasure of indigenous identity.
Both strategies resulted in the creation of “hybrids” – individuals not only seeking to
traverse the margins, but also wholly defined by their existence in the margins. The “decent
indigena” described by de la Cadena (2000) was still only a hybrid – an individual marked as
a racial Other, yet one able, to a certain extent, to perform the identity of the included. While
the embodiment of decency was meant to supersede racial markers, it in many ways further
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emphasized difference that was considered to be a product of race. Mestizos, or individuals of
both indigenous and white heritage, were still stigmatized for their inability to transcend race
through the performance of a learned identity. As de la Cadena notes, “mestizos were
cultural/moral hybrids rather than biological hybrids,” and lacking meaningful inclusion
despite performing Peruvian decency (2000: 65). The moral regulation did not serve to
transcend their race, but instead served to only reinforce the inability to wholly achieve
meaningful inclusion.
How then could an indigenous serrano, as such, transverse the margin to be included
under the aegis of the state? One could propose that the only avenue left available to the
indigenous was that of open contention with the state; however, this too worked against the
interests of the indigenous as “all the rebellions [of the nineteenth century] did was to
reinforce the specific, dominant image of Indians as illiterate and pre-rational [… and]
certified the idea of Indians as irrational rebels, unprepared for citizenship” (de la Cadena
2000: 128). The method of advocacy chosen by the indigenous was seen as a reflection of
their character, and therefore had to work through what was determined to be a legitimate or
“true” form of advocacy – namely, one that was already articulated in the Peruvian state idea.
Open contention with the state only led to the further dismissal of the highlanders as unable
to control their rage, further articulating difference with the refined and controlled nature of
the “civilized and decent” limeños. In appealing to Peruvian decency, indigenous
communities only partially bridged the imagined distance between the urban and the
highlands; however, it did allow individuals to articulate their own performed identity in
relation to the state. Building upon the moral regulation and education of the individual,
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indigenous advocacy was reclaimed by the indigenous to represent their own form of
citizenship.
A “new indigenismo” began in the highlands itself, largely in opposition to this
conception of an Andean peasant as a fetishized indigena. Men like Ricardo Feijóo Reina
organized regional associations and published newsletters like Amazonas5 (Nugent 1997:
179). The origin of the socialist party, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria, 6 is also
associated with this new movement. Party organizers such as Victor Santillán Gutierrez,
Carlos A. Mestanza Chota, and others reached out to indigenous communities as citizens of
the republic rather than wards of the state (Nugent 1997: 232-255). This new indigenismo
was to be used “in the service of a truly democratic vision for the nation” in which all
members were seen to “embody/ metonymically represent what is essential about the nation
as a whole”; thereby articulating not only a demand for egalitarianism, but also recognition
as contributing members of the larger Peruvian nation (Weismantel 2001: 32, Nugent 1997:
10). In doing so, the Andean highlanders were able to maintain their primary identity, by
demonstrating that identity as uniquely constitutive of the national narrative, and therefore
the Peruvian state, while simultaneously adopting citizenship as a means to benefit from the
provision of the formal governing apparatus. In this way, the reproduction of the state idea
was undertaken by the “fringes of the territorial state” as a mode of politics demonstrably
similar to the use of identity by the governing elites themselves (Nugent 1997: 308, emphasis

5

The regional newspaper began publication in 1926 and continued to the early 30s. In later years it was referred
to as La Voz del Pueblo (Nugent 1997: 179).
6
The Alianza Popular Revolucionaria, or APRA, was organized by Haya de la Torre as a populist party that
sought support in both the working and middle class. The party was progressive in seeking reform, but in later
decades was considered to collaborate with the government and leave its founding interests behind (Klarén
2000: 273-5).
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in original). The new indigenismo was, in effect, a bid to integrate the indigenous figure back
into the state idea as a political agent.
Take for example the el pueblo (literally “the people”) movement of the Chachapoyas
region, as studied by David Nugent (1997), which emphasizes the intersection of race,
education, and public movements in the appeal to the governing apparatus by Andean
citizenry. Nugent’s analysis of the el pueblo movement describes a nationhood built from the
community, and collective citizenry, up. Naming el pueblo effectively worked to harness the
people in view of a common goal; most importantly, this happened to be a goal in common
with the interest of the state (Nugent 1997: 150). Much like the demands of the indigenismo
movement, el pueblo demanded access through civil infrastructure – namely, the construction
of roads and the implementation of effective systems of education. Moreover, this “new
indigenismo” was based in the assertion that the people of the highlands could be understood
expansively as el pueblo. In uniting communities of varying ethnic and class identifications
into a singular, pan-Andean entity, el pueblo served as a shift from “vernacular social
relations” to an identity legible to the state (Scott 2009: 257). This can similarly be read as
Trouillot’s identification effect, “a realignment of the atomized subjectivities along collective
lines within which individuals recognize themselves as the same” (2003: 81). This collective
identity, in particular, served to transverse the imagined margins to align to an identity
positioned in relation to the state. As Trouillot asserts, this is not so much an imagined
community as conceived by Benedict Anderson, but instead, an imagined community
“projected against politics” (2003: 88). The unity of el pueblo was specifically imagined
within the context of the state, seeking recognition for the collective just as one would seek
recognition for his or her own identity.
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Encouraged by the efforts made under Leguía’s La Patria Nueva, el pueblo continued
to make gains until, by 1930, it was recognized as a “political force that could no longer be
ignored”, the “core constituency for the region’s new power holders” (Nugent 1997: 266). El
pueblo’s impact was demonstrated in the construction of a unitary group that the state
recognized as representative of the Peruvian indigenous population. El pueblo had,
significantly, returned agency to indigenous communities to the extent that indigenous
leaders were then referred to as power holders. The success of the movement did not go
unrecognized within the region; the efficacy of the movement and its methods were reflected
in other similar political movements of the era. As James Scott notes, “once invented […] a
unit created as a political structure of rule became the idiom of political contestation and
competitive self-assertion” (2009: 259). Peasant federations formed throughout the twentieth
century (though primarily in either the 20s or the 60s) worked to establish not only
connection from the indigenous peasant to the state, but also amongst the comuneros so that
their collective interest would be recognized by the state at least by merit of their numbers
(Handelman 1975: 46, 128). El pueblo’s methods were also used by the burgeoning Alianza
Popular Revolucionaria ,7 particularly in relation to the use of education. The party was well
known for their construction of schools as a means to enter into a community, a tactic later
used by the Shining Path in the 1960s. This emerging pattern in the twentieth century
indicates the success of movements such as el pueblo to imbricate their own interests into the
state idea, forming a method of advocacy identifiable and legitimized by nature of its
continued reproduction through the century. This appeal through the ideological state to the
formal governing state illustrates the reciprocity needed to reproduce the state idea. Although
7

The Alianza Popular Revolucionaria, or APRA, was organized by Haya de la Torre as a populist party that
sought support in both the working and middle class (Klarén 2000: 273-5).
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the indigenous had challenged their exclusion from the formal state, they found “a new social
and political space had opened up for them in the early 1930s. They found that they were
“empowered by the central government just as they sought alliance with the central
government in order to be empowered” (Nugent 1997: 255). This empowerment was made
clear in the recognition of el pueblo as a representative of the indigenous community.
It was largely through marked contradiction to the racialized discourse, which
separated the indigenous from Peruvian citizenry, that the discourse of “new indigenismo”
rose to prominence. Race had been “perfected as a normalizing technology” that served to
delineate who was included in the Peruvian national identity and who was excluded (Poole
1997: 16). Race was consequently constitutive of the discourse surrounding citizenship for,
although citizenship was not denied on the basis of race, meaningful inclusion in the
Peruvian nation was itself delimited by race. Race had acted as the singular reason that full
citizenship could not be extended to the indigenous; however, it also worked as a relatively
consistent means by which to navigate Peruvian society if the correct “racialized” markers
were adopted. As de la Cadena notes,
The taxonomy deriving from a definition of race that subordinated phenotype was
particularly ductile, as it included both the perception of rigid hierarchies and an
unequivocal fluidity to position individuals within it. Thus, although the ranking of
racial groups was consensually accepted and class-related, the definition of what label
adhered to which person left room for negotiation. (de la Cadena 2000: 9)
Race in Peru was no longer a set of biological markers. Through the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, it had come to represent a broad set of performed characteristics as indicated by a
few markers such as place of residence and skin tone.
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The ways in which el pueblo articulated its fitness for citizenship necessarily
deemphasized essentialized race in order to emphasize the performance of race as formative
of a new, notably political, subjectivity: “You too are Peruvian, that is to say Indian. You are
only different from me in your dress and education” (de la Cadena 2000: 308, interview with
Miguel Quispe in 1922). The new indigenismo was constituted on this shift in discourse from
assumed inherent difference to merely cultural difference. Moreover, this claim was
strengthened by the inherent legitimacy of indigenous culture as the pre-colonial past of the
nation. Cultural difference could be regulated, disciplined, and governed through the state;
most importantly, it could be shaped and adapted through the provision of care. Reorienting
the racial division of Peru to a cultural division allowed substantial leverage in establishing
the means to transverse this division. This method of articulating difference specifically
within a field chosen by the movement allowed the participants of el pueblo to address
precisely what social markers differentiated them from the rest of Peruvian society. The
objective of el pueblo was therefore just as much a moral project as it was a political appeal
to the state. By demanding recognition as a certain kind of political subject, indigenous
citizens were also claiming the right to be cared for as a political subject included in the state.
Because the very idea of citizenship was imbricated in the moral and rational character of the
individual, the indigenous individual then had to address the social performance of his or her
own morality and rationality in order to be recognized as a citizen and therefore assert the
indigenous citizen as a new form of political subjectivity. Therefore the new indigenismo set
forth “a single set of moral and ethical principles” in order
to guide the behavior of all individuals regardless of race or caste. Adherence to
these ethical principles of honesty, fair play, and mutual respect was to be a new
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means of achieving social recognition and respect open to all – one based on
individual merit rather than inherited social position. (Nugent 1997: 196)
These principles were then disseminated through publications and became part of public
discourse in moral regulation of the self. As de la Cadena illustrates, even funeral rituals
became the site for the performance and education “about the qualities of decency: the
generosity to serve the collectivity ‘beyond personal interests’, the honesty to do so, and the
sense of justice necessary to guard the precepts of society” (de la Cadena 2000: 56). These
principles continued to be circulated by more diffuse routes as indigenous communities
internalized the discourse. Members of the movement claimed that these articulations of
modern or urbane decency were in fact a reflection of the traditional Incan moral code, “Ama
sua, Ama kella, Ama lulla” – do not steal, do not lie, do not be lazy (Coronado 2009: 47).
These principles continued to be naturalized and integrated into all aspects of life in the
community. Ideas of national participation and contribution entered the home freely, as the
principles outlined by the movement placed increasing emphasis on child rearing and the role
of the mother in shaping future citizens (Nugent 228-31: 1997). The state idea was therefore
reflected back through the individual, as meaningful inclusion became entry into discourse
and national narrative.
However, education was, by far, the principal means by which the indigenous citizen
sought his own empowerment. “The central arena for the construction of this new kind of
citizenship, in the view of activists, is the schoolhouse, the place long recognized as a kind of
‘citizenship factory’” (García 2005: 12). Education became a term equally as expansive as
race, seen to connote not only intelligence, but also the ability to further improve or better
oneself. Education was then paralleled with the increasing modernization and progress of the
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industrializing Peruvian state. Comparatively, the inability to obtain an education or the lack
of material means to do so was synonymous with the plight of the rural indigenous trapped in
circumstance without personal agency. Race was therefore linked to education, as education
level was seen to be culturally determined; however, education also proved to be the means
by which to remove this racial distinction (de la Cadena 2000: 10-11). In the words of
Valcárcel, a Peruvian intellectual of the early twentieth century, ”Receiving a professional
degree is a dignity that erases the stigmas of origin” (de la Cadena 2000: 44, quoting
Valcárcel 1914). Therefore an individual’s education was a means to self-empowerment.
Education became the tool for the indigenous to address their political as well as social
positioning – education was a “cover term used in Amazonas to refer to the range of
disciplinary processes and practices that had to be undertaken in order to make autonomous,
independent, rational subjects out of the region’s unformed and pre-rational Indians and
children” (Nugent 1997: 205). The education of youth then came to the fore as the only
available means for individuals to gain access to both the Peruvian nation and state apparatus,
particularly in reference to the ability of future generations to reach the ideal life in the city.
Largely because of its association with ideas of modernity, education was similarly
considered a political project by the political elites. Education was gradually drawn from the
domestic or community-bounded sphere into the broader public interest of the state. Like
road systems and other forms of civil infrastructure, the Peruvian state had a history of
extending educational systems as a means to open a reciprocal relationship with highlanders,
tapping into the cultural significance of an offered education as a means of inclusion. The
educational system was first extended to the “un-integrated Indian masses” in the late
nineteenth century under Pardo, and again by Leguía in the early twentieth century (Klarén
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2000: 180). During the time of Leguía’s Oncenio alone, the number of students in the nation
rose 62%, from 195,000 in 1920 to 313,000 in 1930 (Klarén 2000: 242). Once the
significance of education as a public good was recognized, the state asserted itself as the
source and provider of that good. Education was then a point of entry for the state to
materialize in the daily life of its citizenry. Education was also recognized for its value to the
state apparatus as a form of penetrative tool that allowed the mechanisms of the state into the
community. It was through the schoolhouses that the state was able to craft its citizens and
shape its nation; “politicians championed the twin ideologies of liberalism and progress,
education occupied center stage as a nation building and racial homogenizing tool” (de la
Cadena 2000: 16). The Peruvian state had identified a key mechanism by which it could turn
policy into the active shaping of its population – even a population as far removed as the
Andean highlanders. The shaping of its citizens was not performed in the management of
curriculum for indoctrination alone, but in the perpetuation of a discourse that saw education
as the means by which to be included in the state. This discourse shifted the onus of inclusion
from the state to the individual, and in doing so, ensured that the state would no longer have
to extend itself to the Andes; instead, the highlanders would increasingly come to the state,
already molded by the specifications of citizen as transmitted through these schools.

The new relationship between the indigenous and the state
Through the demand for state recognition, the serranos were able to define their own
conception of the state and how it should be integrated into their lives – namely as a rational
governing authority that provided access to both economic prosperity. Through defining the
parameters of the relation between the citizen and the state, the new indigenismo articulated a
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new form of political agency for the Andean highlanders. The narrative of el pueblo hinged
upon the acknowledgment of the region’s isolation and lack of ability to control its own
position in relation to both the state apparatus and the national market. Emphasizing in
particular the arbitrary and largely exploitative relation between the highlanders and the casta
system, el pueblo sought to place themselves under the aegis of the Peruvian state in order
for the state apparatus to extend stability through rational-legal authority. The resulting
demands were therefore voiced in terms of access and care as a result of meaningful
inclusion in the Peruvian nation. El pueblo sought a closer relationship to the formal
governing apparatus as allegiance to the state was equated to emancipatory power that was
sure to “release the latent potentialities of the region and its populace, and would result in a
veritable explosion of creative energy – commerce would grow, industries would develop,
and prosperity would come to all” (Nugent 1997: 194). As Holston notes, “Empowerment
happens when a citizen’s sense of an objective source of right in citizenship entails a
corresponding sense of subjective power – power to change existing arrangements (legal and
other), exact compliance, compel behavior” (2008: 16). The el pueblo movement, and others
like it, effectively expanded the concept of Peruvian citizenship to make space for an
indigenous citizen, similarly imbricated in the national narrative. The recognition and care
provided by the state was therefore made substantive and meaningful through the new
political subjectivity of the indigenous citizens.
The movement, although successful, was notably one-sided. While the highlanders
increasingly made themselves available to the state and legible to its processes, the governing
apparatus did little to alter its own structures in return. While the indigenous were appealing
through the ideological state on the basis of their “inherently Peruvian” identity, historicized
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though it may be, the state apparatus still worked largely upon the logic of internal hierarchy.
This conception of an internal hierarchy had infiltrated the state idea as both the formal state
and the citizenry determined that citizenship was to be deserved through the performance of
certain actions and practices. This articulation of mediated inclusion, predicated upon certain
moral and intellectual markers, then served the formal state apparatus as continually
reproducing the means to affect alignment to the state. In terms of the state, this was a
homogenizing project; for the citizens, it was an increasingly delimited passage to inclusion
that required the abandonment of culturally relevant forms of their own identity. State
sovereignty, particularly in the Peruvian context, is then much in line with Agamben’s
assertion that sovereignty is the power to order and distinguish life (2005: 33). The
indigenous subject was therefore not assimilated, but held apart as a separate form of
political subjectivity.
The process of shaping the ideal citizen and receiving recognition could then be
interpreted as effected in the ideological sphere alone. As the margins did become a site for
the alignment of the excluded, it should not be interpreted solely as the result of a coercive
state apparatus, but as the result of a consensual state ideological project that was embodied
in the serranos just as much as within the limeños, and therefore resulted in voluntary
alignment. This ideal form of citizen was generated specifically in the interest of indigenous
communities and bound by the extent of the relationship they required from the state. In
appealing to the state idea built upon conceptions of modernity, decency, and continual moral
progress, the new indigenismo did not erase indigenous identity in order to fit within the
governing apparatus, but instead appealed to the overall Peruvian state idea in order to
demand inclusion.
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Chapter 3
Sri Lanka, the symbolic state
The Sri Lankan state project can be considered through three main sources of
symbolic legitimacy: Buddhism, agriculture, and the state provision of care for those who
participate in these two aspects of Sri Lankan life. Legitimacy and the claim to authority in
Sri Lanka operate on the relationship among these cultural concepts in a constellation of
symbols. Through decades of national narrative and the further elaboration of these symbols
through lived experience, all three can be seen to mutually reinforce each other in the further
reproduction of the state idea as a whole. However, the Sri Lankan state is notably not a
unified whole. The Sinhalese majority constitutes 70% of the island as well as the governing
elite, and the ethnic politics that have dominated the nation since independence have left a
significant portion of the population excluded from not only the benefits from the state, but
also from the ideological project in which the state operates. The Tamil minority,8
approximately 11% of the Sri Lankan population, represents the clearest opposition to a
unilateral Sinhalese claim to the state (Gunasekera 1994: 9). The Sinhalese nationalist project
has sought to assert the reign of the ancient Sinhalese kings as the paradigm of governance in
Sri Lanka, and thereby smuggled in a host of ethnicized assumptions about the nature of the
state. The provision of care specifically has increasingly unified Sinhalese interest with the
interests of the governing apparatus, depicting Sri Lanka as a state of and for its Sinhalese
majority. As Moore notes, “The use of state power for the benefit of the ordinary Sinhalese

8

The Tamil minority itself is divided among the Jaffna Tamils and Estate Tamils, differentiated by their initial
arrival (in the 2nd century BCE and the mid-nineteenth century respectively) and in their form of labor (business
and trade in comparison to plantation work). Although the experiences of these two groups are notably different,
following the narrative of ethnic bifurcation, they are widely regarded as representative of the same population.
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has been, and remains, the primary legitimation, implicit or explicit, of all governments
elected since 1956 at least, and arguably, since 1931” (1985: 29).

Establishing narrative through the Sri Lankan state
Although claims to political legitimacy in Sri Lanka are established through history,
no groups vying for the authority to govern the island claim to be its original inhabitants. The
two most sizeable populations, the Sinhalese and the Tamil, both construct their historical
narratives upon their respective arrivals on the island. While the Tamil population has been
established in the north and east of the island since the 2nd century BCE, the Sinhalese trace
their origin back further to the mythicized union of Vangan9 princess and lion. The exile of
their descendants to Lanka is contiguous with the historically accepted arrival of the
Sinhalese to the island in the 5th century BCE (Sørenson 1996: 70). During roughly the 3rd
century BCE, an extensive irrigation civilization was erected that effectively consolidated
power through the provision of water from a centralized source.10 Sinhalese historical
memory of this period is largely constructed on the repeated invocation of texts like the
Mahavamsa, chronicling the lives of fabled Buddhist kings that constitute the foundation of
symbolic legitimacy in Sri Lanka. In this mythicized past, Tamil and Sinhalese populations
remained more or less separate in their own kingdoms. This separation has remained, in large
part, to the present day. The first population of Tamils, now referred to as the Jaffna Tamils,
occupy primarily the northeast and the Sinhalese occupy the coastal southwest and central
portions of the island. These regions are divided by a band of land referred to as the “Dry
9

The kingdom of Vanga was situated in modern-day Bangladesh.
This fits the Marxist category of an “Asiatic society” wherein the control of water is equated with control
over the towns and people. Edmund Leach further delineated Ceylon as a “hydraulic society” as “the technique
of agriculture does not rely on bringing in water from elsewhere but is based on the local storage of local rain
water for use throughout the year” (1959: 3-8).
10
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Zone,” which, though not uninhabitable, has been sparsely populated as the cultivation of
that land requires the extension of irrigation systems.
Under the British colonial administration (1815-1947), the island, then known as
Ceylon, was utilized primarily as an economic resource. Consequently, colonial rule in
Ceylon was characterized by British disinterest and the intermediary administrators were
used in the absence of direct rule.11 Under the British Raj, a plantation economy was
established in the central region in order to further the economic efficiency of the island.
Ethnic tension was exacerbated during a massive immigration of Tamils from India’s Tamil
Nadu for bonded labor in the nineteenth century on the new plantations of the central
highlands. The division between Sinhalese and Jaffna Tamils was extended to include the
new population of Tamils, increasing dimensions of the ethnic divide to run along class and
labor lines as well.
Following independence in 1948, Sri Lanka was increasingly divided. As the Jaffna
Tamil elite had used the infrastructure of the colonial state to establish themselves as the
leaders of business and trade, the Sinhalese established themselves through the bureaucracy
of the state apparatus. Driven by the idea that Jaffna Tamils controlled the wealth of the state,
the Sinhalese elite sought what Stanley Tambiah refers to as a “leveling” of opportunity and
capacity (1996). Throughout the post-independence era, the Sinhalese used education and
language requirements as leverage by which to turn the civil service from predominantly
Jaffna Tamils to the Sinhalese.12 It was not until the post-independence period that the
chronicles of ancient history were interpreted to support the ethnic bifurcation of the state.
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These intermediaries were known as rate mahatmaya, selected from the Sinhalese aristocracy (Brow 1996:
42).
12
The Sinhala Only Act (formally, the Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956) established Sinhala as the official
language of state and therefore the language necessary to enter the civil service.
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The Mahavamsa was, in fact, extended in 1978 to include the twentieth century in the grand
arc of Sinhalese civilization by the Mahavamsa Compilation Board under the leadership of
Prime Minister JR Jayewardene (Kemper 1991: 181). In order to further ethnic opposition,
the Tamils and Sinhalese were increasingly represented as twin antagonists in these additions,
struggling for dominance throughout recorded history. As conflict was emphasized over
shared history, differences such as religion and occupation were increasingly essentialized.
The Buddhist Sinhalese, primarily paddy farmers, came to be seen as fundamentally different
than the Tamil Hindus and Christians who worked in trade. A false binary was established
that served to pull all other ethnic groups into a similar categorization. Sri Lankan Muslims
and the Burgher descendants of the Portuguese colonization (from the fifteenth to midsixteenth centuries) were associated with the Tamils, while the Veddas, the indigenous
inhabitants of the island, were considered to be not yet Sinhalese.13
The symbolic alignment of the contemporary Sri Lankan state with that of the ancient
Sinhalese irrigation civilization established not only a claim to authority, but also a means by
which to enter into the discourse surrounding the right to provide for a certain demarcated
population. As the state apparatus sought entry into the everyday lives of its citizens, the state
first had to articulate itself in terms recognizable as a claim to govern in a Sri Lankan context.
The Sinhalese savaka sangha (ideal social order), as illustrated by the Mahavamsa, is
predicated upon the state’s encouragement of Theravada Buddhism. As these texts are “more
normative than descriptive,” little is explicitly outlined, but is instead interpreted broadly
from the texts in order to structure the sense and meaning of particular institutions rather than

13

This is asserted primarily through the shared ancestry of Vedda and the Sinhalese. The Vedda are said to be
the descendants of Prince Vijaya, the first king of Sri Lanka, and the indigenous demon princess, Kuveni (Brow
1996: 47).

49

their concrete form (Smith 1972: 31). Most commonly referred to as the Asokan model,14 Sri
Lankan sovereignty is established upon a relationship of caregiving. Kingship, or leadership
in general, was seen as a service to the people – a man tasked with the wellbeing and
prosperity of his people while they would pursue a “life ruled by Dhamma,”15 unconcerned
with their own material wellbeing. The belief that material wellbeing was essential to this
idealized life was seated in “the very pragmatic realization that the pursuit of Nibbana16
necessitates leisured meditation and that this requires both economic sufficiency and a stable
socio-political order” (Smith 1972: 47). Interpreted by the Sinhalese elite, savaka sangha
became a method through which the characteristics of an ideal ruler and deserving population
were articulated in the past and therefore, used to shape an ideal state apparatus in the
twentieth century.
Development discourse and the performance of provision conflated sacred duty and
secular responsibility. Development became the new means by which the state interacted
with its citizens. The provision of care by the state apparatus then became one of the great
legitimizing actions of the state. The savaka sangha connotes both a guarantee of service to
the population and, in return, a guarantee that the population will seek that service solely
from the state. This relationship was furthered in the “process of ‘naturalizing’ or
‘mythifying’ development”; Serena Tennekoon notes the efficacy of “development ritual”
that served to “sacralize the secular and traditionalize the modern” (1988: 302). In combining
Buddhist ethics of care with the duty of the state to care for its citizens, the governing
apparatus was able to articulate the responsibility of the state specifically in respect to the
14

Asoka the Great was an emperor on the Indian subcontinent in the 3rd century BCE recognized for his
philanthropic or paternal style of rule.
15
Dhamma in Pali, or more commonly Dharma, refers to the path of righteousness or living correctly.
16
Nibbana in Pali, or more commonly Nirvana, is the aim of Theravada Buddhism – an enlightened state of
being that is achieved following the path of Buddhist practice.
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population that it sought to govern and in a cultural tenor that further legitimized its actions.
This relation between the righteous king and his subjects, established in historical precedent,
then set a pattern for later regimes to emulate. This can similarly be interpreted as the
legitimization of paternalistic policies based upon the standard established by past kings.
By asserting the moral responsibility to care for a demarcated population, the
governing apparatus had also contributed to the further realization of that population, most
manifestly in the structure of development projects done expressly for peasant populations.
Agricultural development became, in short, “a ‘nationalist enterprise’ for the further
establishment of the central state in the lives of rural peasants” (Tennekoon 1988: 297). The
peasant held a position unique in the Sri Lankan caste system. As a group that was necessary
to the agricultural capacity of the state, the peasants were both politically recognized and
venerated as those who had the clearest reciprocal relation to the Sri Lankan state. It was in
the late stage of colonization, when colonial administration was in the hands of Sri
Lankans,17 that the state apparatus first interpreted peasants as a unitary population: “Instead
of conceiving of farmers as simply producers of food, or part of a population problem, or the
majority of Sri Lanka’s people, they [the Sinhalese elite] began to conceive of ‘peasants’ as a
social institution that needed to be protected” (Kemper 1991:140). Following independence,
Sri Lanka chose to become a nation of peasants (Moore 21-22: 1985). By establishing
connection to a population that would benefit from a welfare system, the Sri Lankan state
initiated a reciprocal relationship with its peasants through the provision of care. Therefore,
the development program and any further state building was situated in the further assembly
of peasants and the elaboration of their role in relation to the state.
17

Between 1931 and independence in 1947 in British Ceylon, authority to govern was granted to a Sri Lankan
administrative body, the State Council of Ceylon.
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The peasantry first became a moral project of the state in this post-independence
period, as “the ‘peasantry’ were believed to have fallen into vicious ways due to the impact
on rural society of colonialism and capitalism” and “in their own best interests ‘peasants’
were expected to submit to public programmes to uplift their morals” (Moore 1985: 198, 3).
These “vicious ways” were shorthand for the introduction of wage labor and the breakdown
of the traditional community following the British plantation system. The physical and moral
wellbeing of the rural peasantry was understood to metonymically represent the health and
stability of the nation as a whole and therefore, “Today, the credo of the Sinhalese majority is
largely that of a collectivity that is experiencing the eroding of the traditional organic
structure that stabilized it” (Tambiah 1986: 60). Paternalist concern was soon extended to the
construction of the Sri Lankan welfare state18 as the governing apparatus sought to further
establish its authority to care for the peasantry. Among the peasants it was the paddy farmers
that held legitimacy as those who maintained a traditional, virtuous Buddhist lifestyle;
identification as a paddy farmer “indicates a social status rather than a simple occupation […
and] connotes ‘honorable citizens’ or the ‘good people’, i.e. those unencumbered with
onerous menial service obligations, and thus left free to pursue agriculture” (Moore 1985:
172). Often cast in comparison to plantation farmers, who were relatively more productive, it
was the symbolic import of a subsistence farmer, greatly reliant upon community, that
defined paddy farmers as an ideal-type citizen for the Buddhist state. Drawing upon a
mythicized past, paddy farmers were culturally interpreted as the symbolic continuation of
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By 1948, the year of Sri Lankan independence, state expenditure on social services took up over 56% of the
state’s overall revenue (Moore 1985: 226). As Brow explains, “A vast array of government programs, ranging
from the improvement of village irrigation works and the provision of credit, fertilizer, insecticide, and new
strains of seed, on the one hand, to the grant of food rations and the construction of rural schools, hospitals, and
dispensaries on the other, were either introduced or expanded in the period after independence” (1996: 73).
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the ancient irrigation civilization, and therefore for the ideal citizen of the modern Sinhalese
state.
In articulating this glorified past as a lost glory, and combined with the Buddhist
conception of reawakening, the newly independent state established an evocative national
narrative centered upon the reestablishment of paddy farming as the way of life in Sri Lanka
(Woost 1993: 507). This narrative had a significant amount of influence as it drew the smallholder farmers, to which it was addressed, increasingly into the national narrative, and
therefore into the state project. E.V. Daniel emphasizes that this was not only building upon
the past in order to return to a previous condition, but also creating a “fusion in horizons”
wherein the past and present become one in order to produce a valued future (Daniel 1996:
52). The Sinhalese nationalist identity had appealed to a historical grounding and therefore
was increasingly shaped as primordial. It is balanced by the “participatoriness” of the mythic
that creates a means by which to be Sinhala, namely, to imbricate oneself directly into this
narrative by becoming a paddy farmer (Daniel 1996: 52). The introduction of the plantations
under the colonial economy was then determined to be a corruption of the traditional form of
life, and paddy agriculture retained symbolic legitimacy as the return of subsistence farming
was considered a form of Buddhist virtue. It was specifically the concretization of a
mythicized historical past that provided the basis upon which subsequent governments built
their authority to author the future. The discourse of development lent itself particularly to
this nationalist enterprise. By identifying the recipient of such schemes as peasants and the
intended result as the facilitation of a righteous Buddhist lifestyle, the state was able to
establish itself as the source of this idealized life.
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Appealing to the ideal citizen and the goyigama caste
The state further articulated the ideal citizen, which it intended to rule, in the
implementation of development projects. Through the provision of care, the interests of the
newly unified group were aligned with the interests of the governing apparatus. A continuous
loop was established between the state and the aligned individual as the Sinhalese farmers
could more “readily situate themselves in the symbolic flow of development discourse by
making their own activities in the past resonate with one of its [the state’s] central themes”
(Woost 1993: 511). This conscious quest for the establishment of a consensual hegemony
played a significant role in the form and function of the government in the daily life of rural
Sinhalese. As Prime Minister DS Senanayake writes, “The function of our Government
Department is to guide and educate, not to compel. Its ultimate goal is its own extinction
when the people have been so thoroughly imbued with the co-operative idea that its value
need no longer be taught” (1935: 79).
The formation of a Sri Lankan ideal citizen not only benefited the elites who sought
to augment their authority through the symbolic capital of the state, it also served to
reproduce the state itself. The fabricated institutional identity was so fully imbricated in the
history and culture of Sri Lanka that it became a constitutive aspect of the state as a whole. In
line with Eric Hobsbawm’s argument (1990), the nation did not precede the state, but rather
the state preceded the nation. There was not a cohesive Sri Lankan nation that preceded the
post-colonial establishment of the Sri Lankan state; instead, the establishment of the state’s
borders predated the increasing homogenization of its citizenry. This distinction lies in the
assumed legitimacy of a nation as a naturally unified, cohesive body, while a state exists as a
juridical-legal container. As demonstrated by the work of Trouillot (2003) and Scott (1998),
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the development of a cohesive population, or nation, is a continuous project of the state – not
merely recognized in the articulation of borders, but actively constructed through those
borders and the state apparatus that controls them.
The Sinhalese government also sought to form an increasingly homogeneous
population akin to the mythicized Buddhist rural population of pre-colonial times in order to
preserve this claim to authority. If the righteous rule of Sinhalese kings was in conjunction
with a virtuous peasant population, engineering a similarly homogeneous peasant population
would legitimate the continued rule of the Sinhalese elite. The state was not only intent upon
the establishment of control over territory, but moreover sought to establish itself upon the
continual shaping and control of its population. The provision of care worked as an avenue
by which this relationship was established. As a result, cultural ideas of the ideal citizen and
the performance of citizenry have filtered through these symbolic discourses to determine the
merit of the individual in regards to their claim over resources distributed by the state.
Consequently, Sri Lanka has been called “the most politicized society in Asia,” “a society
where employment, education, housing, and access to consumer goods have all been tied at
various points in the past two decades to political loyalty” (Kemper 1991: 190). As Moore
argues, this is characteristic of the way governance functions in the Sri Lankan state; “Sri
Lankan politics is ultimately oriented mainly to the question of who shall enjoy privileged
access to services distributed by the state” (1985: 224). In tracing the formation of this
relationship – through the establishment of an idealized population, the articulation of the
role of that population, and the elaboration of that population’s performed identity – the
significance of the state as an ideological project is made clear. This case study then lends
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itself as a perspective from which to address the Sri Lankan governing apparatus as an
operative of the reproduction of a broader and much more abstract state.
The Sinhalese identity itself is posited upon an increasing internal unity as nationalist
and state projects continually seek the progressive homogenization within that identity;
“antagonisms of class, caste, and region are displaced and obscured by an insistent emphasis
on the common interests that unite all who belong within the nation” (Brow 1990: 9). By
asserting itself as the means by which to continue a higher quality of life, the national
narrative exerted a significant coercive force on its relatively heterogeneous population. The
state therefore “became instrumental for the social advancement of the subordinate groups
within the Sinhalese class alliance” or rather, asserted itself as the sole means by which to
prosper within the hegemonic norm of the Sinhalese state (Stokke 1998: 98). The average Sri
Lankan must demonstrate his acceptance of the Sinhalese identity in order to position himself
to continue receiving the benefits of the state. Although seeking inclusion in the state project
was not too difficult for the average Sinhalese, regardless of their occupation, this did
problematize the relation of the state to its other citizens, most significantly the Tamil
population. Tamils, as such, cannot contribute to the legitimacy of the Sinhalese state
apparatus except through their exclusion. It is only through the exclusion of the Other that the
reciprocal relationship between the Sinhalese and the governing elites can function as a
unique assurance of wellbeing provided only to those included in the symbolic extent of the
nation. Since independence, Sri Lanka, and particularly its governing apparatus, has overseen
a “continuing and largely successful campaign of ‘Sinhalisation’ of the state in both symbolic
and material terms” (Moore 1985: 196). The construction of an ideal-type through which the
Sri Lankan state was to govern is a constitutive moment for the state project as a whole. The
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formation of an ideal-type citizen in general can be considered a concrete abstraction that,
while never perfectly manifest in any individual, exists in identifiable characteristics that can
be drawn upon by both the average citizen and the governing apparatus itself. Similarly, in
Agamben’s description of the “example,” he notes that “the example is thus excluded from
the normal case not because it doesn’t belong to it but, on the contrary, because it exhibits its
own belonging to it” (2005: 22). The Tamils, as the “exception,” are “included in the normal
case precisely because it does not belong” and “non-belonging can be shown only at the
center” (2005: 22). Through Agamben’s example and exception, the cohesion of the Sri
Lankan state is articulated in reference to both the Sinhalese and the Tamil, and strengthened
by this internal exclusion.
Caste in particular demonstrates the extent to which a Gramscian consent is more
operative in the formation of this ideal citizen than is coerced alignment to the state project.
Unlike the Indian caste system, the Sinhalese caste system does not articulate difference
along the lines of intrinsic purity/impurity in the categorization of individuals; rather, caste
functions to articulate the individual’s positionality in relation to the state (Scott 2009: 244).
Most importantly, caste establishes a claimed identity that demonstrates not only the relation
of the subjects to the system in which they live, but also their relative status among those
around them. An individual’s caste determines the amount of “social honor and prestige” that
others must demonstrate in recognition of that status (Gunasekera 1994: 7). Caste is not
understood to be a concrete or essentialized identity, but a fluid relation that hinges upon the
recognition of others. Therefore, the use of one’s caste is operative in terms of how an
individual is perceived by his or her community, and how one wishes to be perceived.
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Following this recognition of paddy farmers as representative of national identity, a
group of elite families (the Senanayake, Silva, and Attygalle) chose to ascribe to the
goyigama caste near the end of the nineteenth century. As families that had established
themselves in mining, plantation agriculture, and arrack renting under the British Raj, their
new money from their capitalist enterprises needed to be authenticated through this Sinhalese
narrative (Jayawardena 2002: 192). These families therefore reinforced their claim to land
and wealth they had amassed through the consistent affirmation of their status as paddy
farmers by birth, regardless of their actual proximity to a paddy field. The assertion of
cultural legitimacy was further augmented by their increasing economic wealth until these
families, and others like them, became established as the new aristocratic elite on the island,
superseding the old money Mudaliyars.19 Through the further consolidation of their
economic and social status, the elite chose to articulate their relation to the colonial state in
symbolic terms by asserting their caste as goyigama. As goyigama itself is literally translated
as paddy farmer or a cultivator, the caste became an index from which the average Sinhalese
could simultaneously claim a position in the ruling aristocracy while also rooting authority in
a mythicized past. The value in ascribing to this caste was deeply established given that
nearly fifty percent of the Sinhalese population self-identified with the goyigama caste during
the latter part of the colonial period (KM de Silva 1986: 20). Identity was therefore not a
matter of essentialized or ascribed categorization, but the voluntary identification with the ingroup. While this conception of caste was seated in the pre-colonial relationship between the
feudal king and his serfs – by articulating the manner in which they would serve him – it was
also encouraged under the British Raj.
19

The Tamil Mudaliyars were established as the ruling elite under Portuguese colonial rule, roughly the 16th to
the mid 17th century. Comparatively, their legitimacy was established through wealth and status, and they did
not enact their caste as a form of governing legitimacy as did the new goyigama families.
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Goyigama accordingly became the hegemonic index according to which some
Sinhalese ascribed in order to be seen as a citizen of the state. When universal suffrage was
established by the British in 1931,20 the goyigama identity immediately became the only
electoral identification capable of transferring authority en masse to an individual candidate.
Prime ministers like JR Jayewardene and DS Senanayake were noted for their continual use
of the goyigama identity in order to establish themselves in the political sphere. The caste
soon became synonymous with the electoral base of the United National Party (UNP),
“popularly regarded as the party of the aristocracy” (Gunasekera 1994: 109). Moreover, the
goyigama caste was no longer utilized solely in reference to the present, but was extended
backwards to map the goyigama identity onto the fabled Sinhalese kings like
Parakramabahu.21 The internal hierarchy of the goyigama caste was established through
relating the paddy farmer with the king who provided the means by which paddy farming
was enabled (namely, irrigation). This hierarchy allowed high-ranking political elites to
identify with subsistence farmers, therefore concretizing the relationship between the
politician and his constituency on the basis of shared identity and, similarly, participation in
the same symbolic system. The positionality of the goyigama identity therefore deepened the
authority of politicians to situate themselves historically in a royal lineage rife with symbols
from which to continually draw and reproduce their authority. It was the governing elite who
contributed to reproduction of symbols that reproduced their own legitimacy while also
reproducing the state idea.
By the end of the nineteenth century, “the goyigama […] closed ranks to defend their
long accepted status as the most ‘honorable’ of the castes – just as paddy cultivation was the
20

Via the Donoughmore Constitution, in effect from 1931 until 1947
Parakrambahu reigned from 1164–1197 and is credited with the construction of 1470 new tanks (Leach 1959:
10).
21
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most ‘honorable’ vocation – and their position at the apex of the caste structure” (KM de
Silva 1986: 43). What was initially a form of identity that derived legitimacy through its
representation of the Sinhalese national narrative, and therefore creating an inclusive identity,
then began to turn outward, defining itself in opposition to other identities. The use of
exclusion can then be interpreted as a further elaboration of the goyigama identity itself – a
means by which to fully establish the character and form of a member of the goyigama in
relation to an Other. As Brow notes, the goyigama identity was further elaborated in its
opposition to the Veddas, the “jungle-dwelling hunters and gatherers,” that were seen to be
racially distinct from the Sinhalese population (Brow 1996: 45). As paddy agriculture was
tied to the mythic Sinhalese irrigation civilization, the use of irrigation was subsequently
valorized as the imposition of civilization over nature. Comparatively, the hunting and
gathering methods maintained by the Veddas were seen as a lack of ability to shape the world
around them. As Scott argues, “The idea of civilization was in large measure an agroecological code” upon which ideas of society were correlated with the manner in which they
shaped their land; “the civilized change the world; the barbarians live in the world without
changing it” (2009: 101, 104). Neither identity was strictly delineated by discernible racial
markers, but was used instead as shorthand to denote the perceived presence or lack of
civility; a Vedda therefore represented “those among them who lack the cultural attributes
that collectively define a civilized and distinctly Sinhala identity” (Brow 1996: 5).
In this way, relation to the state – namely, either as a productive member or one who
refuses integration – was evoked symbolically to critique or condemn individuals on the
basis of their character. As with the concept of Peruvian decency, performance of an identity
could, to a certain extent, supersede essentialized identity. Any individual of any caste could
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be referred to as Vedda for the smallest infraction of social norms, especially in relation to
their civility and ability to contribute to the community (Brow 1996: 45). This constructed
binary of civility/incivility was then extended to assert a claim to authority in ruling Sri
Lanka. In comparison to the Vedda, the goyigama represented a caste identity that was
largely predisposed to the state system – especially in being characterized by an occupation
that necessitated state intervention (irrigation) and the consistent reaffirmation of the
symbolic value of civilization. Whether this was a result of the caste being established
largely under colonial rule, or the natural expression of an identity, the result was a cultural
claim to the authority to lead the nation and thus to control the governing apparatus. As the
decades passed, the goyigama identity had increasingly little to do with the actual profession
of the individual, but instead became an avenue through which the average individual could
opt-in to the state project, particularly with the entry of the goyigama caste into the civil
service and legal profession (Jayawardena 2002: 197). The goyigama caste then became
synonymous with the Sinhalese elite that controlled the Sri Lankan state apparatus, even
while under the British Raj. The goyigama were themselves the idealized Sri Lankan
population through which the Sinhalese state apparatus governed and therefore the image of
citizenship.

The new relationship between the Sinhalese and the state
The performance of the goyigama caste was no longer only in recognition of what the
state sought from its population, but in what the population sought from the state. Those who
aligned to the ideal identity had the basis to demand the benefits of the state simply by virtue
of that identity. While caste can be considered as a social and symbolic means of performing
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identity (as it requires not only the relation to others, but the recognition of others), in terms
of the state and access to provided care, identity could no longer only be enacted
symbolically, but also must be legally recognized through inclusion in the governing
apparatus. Ethnicity, then, became the means by which the symbolic nation could be
translated into the language of the governing apparatus. It was through the recognition of
Sinhalese ethnicity that individuals sought their relation to the state; an “effective hegemony
that successfully articulates the interests of the peasants to the project of their rulers also
demands that rhetorical concessions […] be accompanied by the distribution of real, material
benefits” (Brow 1990: 9-10).
It could then be argued that the Sinhalese are exclusively entitled to the provision of
care from the state by nature of their ethnicity. While the paddy farmer claims his right of
access to the means of subsistence as based upon the nature of his relation to the state
apparatus that established itself on the protection of that right, so too do the Sinhalese
demand provision from the state merely for their presence as Sinhalese on Sinhalese land.
This form of demand upon the state is encapsulated in what Tambiah refers to as “group
entitlements,” which denote not only demands for welfare, but also demands for recognition
of social capital through positions of status as granted by the state (Tambiah 1996: 337).
What results is the perpetuation of the same; reciprocity serves to underpin the rationale for
governance:
The instrumental efficacy of ethnicity in making claims on the resources of the
modern state inevitably in turn reinforces and maintains ethnic political machinery –
patron/client networks, bossism, and patronage structures. (Tambiah 1996: 335)
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The state itself is therefore circumscribed by merit of its assumed Sinhalese identity and its
accompanying corpus of symbols. Although the autocratic rule of the twentieth century has
greatly augmented the authority of the governing apparatus, it could not change the source of
its authority. The Sinhalese governing apparatus remained constrained by its state idea as
long as it was also reliant on the “constellation of symbols” that underpinned it.
The value in the provision of care is as necessary to the legitimacy of modern day
politicians as it was to the kings before them. Therefore, the development projects of the Sri
Lankan state were seated first and foremost in the past through “stressing continuities and
connections between former virtues, present policies, and future aspirations” (Brow 1990: 9).
As Daniel emphasizes, Sinhalese legitimacy is rooted in an “objectivist history” wherein
“signs of the Sinhala past […] are seen as actualized events” and therefore “burdened with
the need to concretize” (Daniel 1996:27-28).
Through the literal reconstruction of past triumphs, contemporary Sinhalese
politicians such as DS Senanayake and JR Jayewardene have established their own
legitimacy on the shoulders of mythicized monarchs. DS Senanayake was the first prime
minister to identify himself as the heir apparent to the ancient irrigation civilization,
particularly in his claimed blood relation to King Parakramabahu (Kemper 1991: 161). His
accomplishments were similarly made to emphasize the continuity between the fabled reign
of such kings to his own administration from 1947 to 1952. As Moore noted, “more than
anyone else, DS Senanayake was responsible for infusing Sinhalese nationalism with the
vision that the colonization of the Dry Zone was a return to the heartland of the ancient
irrigation civilization of the Sinhalese” (1985: 45).22 Moreover, Senanayake’s skillful
22

The “colonization of the Dry Zone” refers to “the creation of agricultural settlements in the undeveloped
interior of the island, or colonization” and “is associated primarily with the UNP” (Peebles 1990: 30). Through
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utilization of symbol and ritual set a precedent for later politicians to align themselves with.
A subsequent prime minister, JR Jayewardene (1977-198923), worked to extend the symbolic
beyond the justification for political strategy and further aggregated power to the office of the
executive. Jayewardene’s time in office was replete with public work projects and
demonstrations of the symbolic strength of the state. This can be seen as an almost direct
result of his neoliberal economic policies, in an attempt to assuage the effects of policies that
“had adverse impacts on those groups that were particularly more dependent on general state
protection and welfare transfers i.e. peasants” (Stokke 1998: 103). Jayewardene and his party,
the United National Party, addressed grievances against the state through the combination of
liberalization schemes and large-scale public sector investments (Stokke 1998: 104). Broader
infrastructural development projects were supplemented by purely symbolic projects such as
the planting of bo tree saplings in each of the nine administrative capitals on the island.24
Jayewardene’s example therefore clearly established the primacy of ritual and symbol in
executive rule on the island.
In one project illustrative of this point, the Mahaweli Scheme (formulated in 1958,
but undertaken in the late 1960s), governing apparatus had the opportunity to devise its ideal
society quite literally from the ground up. In roughly 5 years, 150,000 to 200,000
predominantly Sinhalese families were to be resettled in the Dry Zone, newly made habitable
by the diversion of the Mahaweli River (Sørenson 1996: 7-8, 78). These new villages then
government irrigation projects, primarily Sinhalese communities were encouraged to move to areas made newly
inhabitable by the constant supply of water. Notably, the land on which most Sinhalese were resettled was what
was previously considered to be the buffer zone between Sinhalese and Tamil populations (Moore 1985: 196-7).
23
JR Jayewardene was technically only prime minister until 1978 when he introduced the executive presidency,
which established the president as both the head of state and the head of government. Jayewardene was then
president until 1989.
24
The bo tree (bo being the Sinhalese translation of Bodhi, or enlightenment) of Sri Lanka was itself a sapling
taken from the original Bodhi tree in India under which the Buddha gained enlightenment. The daughter of one
of the Sinhalese kings, King Asoka, took the sapling with her to plant in the ancient capital of Anuradhapura,
which today is in central Sri Lanka.
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became a social engineering project of the state. These villages, or “centralized block of
houses”, meant to replicate the structure of an idealized Buddhist community,25 were then
used to represent the state as a whole, declaring the “Sinhalese nation as a nation of villages,”
just as the wellbeing of the peasant had previously been used to metonymically represent the
health of the nation (Brow 1988: 311, Woost 1994: 90). However, in the use of an artificial
village to represent the nation, the state apparatus was also artificially constructing the image
of the state. By drawing symbolic legitimacy from a racially, religiously, and economically
homogeneous unit, the state was able to articulate a vision of the island as equally
homogeneous – importantly obfuscating sites of difference that have caused an impediment
to the further aggregation of power by the Sinhalese elite. As Brow emphasizes, these
projects and their accompanying rituals were “not produced solely for the edification of the
villagers” (Brow 1990: 7); rather it was through these rituals and projects that the state
materialized and therefore also formed the site of state reproduction.
The most potent historical symbols of the ancient irrigation civilization centered upon
the tank (väva), Buddhist temple (dāgäba), and paddy field (yāya) “as metonyms for material
prosperity and spiritual wellbeing […] Together, they constitute an iconographic code for the
dharmistha samajaya (righteous society) slogan espoused by the UNP government”
(Tennekoon 1988: 297). The three also represent the shape of the idealized Buddhist village:
autonomous in production, yet internally dependent upon members of the community as well
as in their singular line to the state – the irrigation tank. Renovation of these irrigation tanks,
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As Brow notes, the method of agriculture and the surrounding environment have “imposed a uniformity” on
the structure of traditional villages: “Each village normally contains a tank, the paddy fields it irrigates, a
collection of wattle and daub houses clustered close to the tank bund, and a square mile or so of surrounding
scrub jungle that separates itself from its nearest neighbors” (1996: 35).
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left in ruins by the passage of time, has constituted the majority of irrigation projects through
the twentieth century.
The implementation of irrigation schemes works largely in the same capacity as it did
a couple thousand years ago. Welfare sits at a unique juncture of both the mythicized and
material realities of the Sri Lankan state; the symbols that are used copiously throughout such
projects also serve the same ends as the penetrative, controlling state apparatus:
In Sri Lanka, development is not only a set of discourses implicated in the placement
of the island’s economy within the world economic system, in local contexts it is also
a means through which to carry out the moral regulation and surveillance of the
formation of the nation state. (Woost 1994: 81)
The result of the Mahaweli Project is the most illustrative of this point. Rather than recreating
the idealized villages of the mythicized past, the state has extended itself in order to maintain
control. The state did not work to create a system of autonomous villages, nor did it work to
empower its citizens as individuals through a self-sufficient lifestyle; rather, it sought to
further economic and political ties that ensured further the dependence of the village on the
centralized state apparatus. By expanding into the “uninhabitable” Dry Zone, the state has
ensured that its monopoly on the provision of water has effectively established the state as
the sole provider of any political or economic good. As Moore elaborates this relationship in
terms of Andre Gunder Franks’ core –periphery model, the villages became increasingly less
connected among themselves while growing increasingly reliant on their connection to the
state core (Moore 1985: 131).
While the initial logic of irrigation in a pre-colonial state ostensibly rested in
productive capacity and the established settlement of delineated territory, the method became
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even more valuable for a modern nation-state. In the reconstruction of ancient irrigation
systems, the Sinhalese state reasserted its previous territorial claim on the island, using the
irrigation of land as a rationale to resettle thousands of Sinhalese to the previously
uninhabitable Dry Zone. Playing upon the significant binary of civility/incivility, the
extension of irrigation and paddies indicated “the truly pivotal act in converting jungle into a
civilized community” (Woost 1993: 511). Moreover, this extension of civility was
considered to be the benevolent gift of the state in the offering of the means by which to
continue subsistence paddy agriculture, which either environment or the economy might
otherwise prohibit, and therefore played directly into a pattern of paternalist governance.
In this way, the care provided by the Sri Lankan governing apparatus functions on
the relationship established by that care, namely, a hierarchical or paternalistic care for the
Sinhalese peasants by their Sinhalese political elites. It was precisely the form and content of
provided care – the provision of irrigation to paddy fields – that determined the model of life
for Sri Lankan villagers. As in Peru, the appeal to the state idea offered a means to align to
the state project through a particular form of political subjectivity that was established within
the circulating discourse of the state idea. However, in the Sri Lankan case, this still excluded
Sri Lankan citizens who were interpreted to be historically excluded from the state idea as
well – the Tamil. In regards to Sri Lanka, the boundaries of the state idea and the territorial
borders of the state are not congruous. Rather, the state idea, active in reproducing ethnic
exclusion, was constitutive in defining the Sinhalese identity. Therefore, through
strengthening the claims made to ethnic division, the state idea was reproduced through
provision of care predicated on that ethnic division.
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Chapter 4
Concluding remarks
The purpose of the comparative study is to emphasize the correspondence between
two distinct cases in order to express the provision of care as a strategy of governing –
specifically a strategy of claiming authority to govern from the state idea. As previously
defined, the state idea references the ways in which the state is understood conceptually as a
legitimate, functional governing agent, which is then established and reproduced through
cultural markers, practices, or symbols that are enacted in the daily governance of the state.
The forms articulated through these case studies – the ideal citizen, engineered consent, and
positional identities – serve to demonstrate the manifestations of this form of power.
Moreover, the comparison of two such diverse cases illustrates the value of this approach in
further analyzing the state idea, not only a form of affective power, but also as a discourse to
be drawn upon by governing elites and marginalized populations alike. It is not only, as
Althusser argues (1971), the “repressive state apparatus” that benefits from the reproduction
of the state idea, but any individual or group that is considered under the aegis of that
ideology. The state idea exists through interpretation; as it is reproduced, it is also produced
anew. The form of the state idea is not reliant upon an explicit articulation of a claim to
authority to maintain its hegemony; rather, by existing as a constellation of ideas, implicitly
connected and reproduced through daily governance, the state idea is a fertile terrain for both
the governing apparatus and population to work through, rather than against.
Through both case studies, the provision of care has been referred to as a point of
access, both for the governing apparatus into the lives of its citizens as in the Sri Lankan case,
and for Peruvian indigenous citizens to access their governing apparatus. As articulated in the
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theoretical framework for this project, I argue that the provision of care is also a point of
entry for the state idea to enter into, and continue to shape, the form and logic of the
governing apparatus and the population itself. It is through this mediation by the state idea
that the state as a conception of legitimate governance exists between the population and
governing apparatus, not solely defined by either. It is the expression of a form of
governance, first articulated in the state idea and reflected in the relationship between the
governing apparatus and the population, that confers legitimacy upon a governing body. It is
through everyday governance that authority to govern is established, but more importantly, it
is through everyday governance that the means to legitimate that authority is also reproduced.
As I noted in the Peru case, indigenous Peruvians increasingly established their
relation to the state in terms of the access they were given to the governing apparatus. In
providing roads and education, the governing state was able to control and position the
indigenous population in relation to the state through the means of access granted to them. In
terms of education in particular, the ideal citizen was formed through the provided means of
care as schoolhouses were considered “citizenship factories” (García 2005: 12). Through
their demand to be included in the state, and the provision of care that was established in
response, indigenous citizens were increasingly shaped through the moral and political
project of the state, resulting in the new subjectivity of the indigenous citizen. This new
subjectivity was established through the state idea, as the claim to citizenship and the
provision of care considered suitable for that citizen where both mediated by the discourses
that determine the role of the state in the lives of its citizens.
In the Sri Lanka case, the idea of a nation of peasants was reflected in the form of
care the state chose to provide, and who that care was provided to. Through irrigation, the

69

governing apparatus actively facilitated a certain form of life – namely the subsistence paddy
farmer – to create a cohesive population in reflection of the mythicized past of the Sinhalese
irrigation civilization. The constellation of symbols and practices that were invoked in the
provision of irrigation then served to establish a legitimate form of governance, reworked
through the state idea to articulate a new form of legitimacy for the modern governing state.
The idealized paddy farmer was then reflected in the Sinhalese caste system, through the
articulation of the goyigama caste, and then through politics, as the goyigama caste became
the dominant electorate. The Sri Lankan governing apparatus then succeeded in tying an
ideal form of subjectivity to meaningful inclusion in the nation. This expression of the state
idea, in the increasing alignment of citizens to a subjectivity constructed by the governing
apparatus, demonstrates the capacity of care as a strategy to work in conjunction with the
state’s intent to create a cohesive, unitary nation, where the life of the population legitimates
the nature of its governing body.
In regard to the individual, the receipt of care from a governing body itself should be
considered interpellation. Once provision of care is established, political subjects necessarily
enter into an ideologically mediated relation with their present form of governance. It is
precisely through this entry into a relationship with a governing apparatus that individuals
become citizens, subjects, and beneficiaries of the state. The creation of such subjectivities,
particularly positional identities, is necessarily of fundamental interest to the state. The
resulting proliferation of ideas and concepts that mediate the individual and the state as the
state idea grows is neither a deliberate, conscious form of power aggregation, nor is it merely
the passive result of this interaction. Instead, as I have argued through these case studies, it is
directly a result of the agency and decisions of both the governing apparatus and the
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population working in consonance or in opposition. It is between the governing apparatus
and its population that a discursive terrain is formed as a means to communicate legitimacy
between the two.
The state, as an ongoing project, is not invested in the establishment of positional
identities, nor the articulation of an ideal citizen, nor the facilitation of an increasingly
homogeneous, cohesive population alone. Rather it is interested in what is made possible
through all these forms. The engineering of consent that is arrived at through these forms
further facilitates the means by which the ideological state continues to function. When the
state operates in consensus as well as coercion a new field of possibilities is opened for the
state, particularly in the interrelation of these forms. Therefore, the ideological state should
be considered, as noted by Mitchell, as a “machinery of intentions” that, though “usually
termed rule making, decision making, or policymaking” such as the institutionalization of the
provision of care, in terms of effect the “state essentially becomes a subjective realm of plans,
programs, or ideas” (1999: 82).
While the process of provision and receipt of care masquerades as banal, its effects
are anything but. These cases demonstrate that the way in which populations are positioned
in relation to their governing apparatus is fundamental to the provision of care. In Peru, the
provision of roads and schools gave indigenous communities a concrete point of access to
meaningful inclusion within the nation as modern citizens. In Sri Lanka, the extension of
irrigation projects encouraged rural villagers to become subsistence paddy farmers, reliant on
the provision of water by the state. Both cases then demonstrate the means by which material
care provided by the governing apparatus affects the subjectivity of its recipients. The
capability of these positional identities to then shape the form and substance of governance in
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these two states demonstrates the significance care provision to the reproduction of the state.
As I argued in the introduction of this paper, the provision of care as a strategy of governance
is capable of far more than how it is perceived as a “mundane practice” of governance.
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